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It is typical for digital instrumentation and controls, used to manage 
significant risk, to undergo substantial amounts of scrutiny. The equipment must 
be proven to have the necessary level of design integrity. The details of the 
scrutiny vary based on the particular industry, but the ultimate goal is to provide 
sufficient evidence that the equipment will operate successfully when performing 
their required functions. 
To be able to stand up to the scrutiny and more importantly, successfully 
perform the required safety functions, the equipment must be designed to defend 
against random hardware failures and also to prevent systematic faults. These 
design activities must also have been documented in a manner that sufficiently 
proves their adequacy.  
The variability in the requirements of the different industries makes this 
task difficult for instrumentation and controls equipment manufacturers. To assist 
the manufacturers in dealing with these differences, a standardization of 
requirements is needed to facilitate clear communication of expectations. The 
IEC 61508 set of standards exists to fulfill this role, but it is not yet universally 
embraced.  After that occurs, various industries, from nuclear power generation 
to oil & gas production, will benefit from the existence of a wider range of 
equipment that has been designed to perform in these critical roles and that also 
includes the evidence necessary to prove its integrity. The manufacturers will 
then be able to enjoy the benefit of having a larger customer base interested in 
their products. 
The use of IEC 61508 will also help industries avoid significant amounts of 
uncertainty when selecting commercial off-the-shelf equipment. It is currently 
understood that it cannot be assumed that a typical commercial manufacturer’s 
equipment designs and associated design activities will be adequate to allow for 
success in these high risk applications. In contrast, a manufacturer that seeks to 
comply with IEC 61508 and seeks to achieve certification by an independent third 
party can be assumed to be better suited for meeting the needs of these 
demanding situations. Use of these manufacturers help to avoid substantial 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
Industries that utilize digital instrumentation and controls equipment to 
manage significant risk must overcome many hurdles that other industries do not 
encounter. Because of these significant risks, the nuclear industry, the defense 
industry, and some of the process industries go to great lengths to ensure their 
facilities operate safely and reliably. These efforts cause instrumentation and 
controls equipment manufacturers to have levels of requirements imposed on 
them that are much more demanding and rigorous than what they typically 
experience. As should be expected, such equipment is subject to considerable 
price increases and significant delivery time delays. 
In these cases, digital commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment is being 
evaluated and utilized for safety applications. Typically these evaluations occur 
on a case-by-case, application-specific basis. It would be advantageous to users 
and producers of the equipment if these evaluations could move towards being 
more generic and standardized. If other industries understand the criteria utilized 
in that original evaluation they may be able to leverage it and eliminate redundant 
effort towards their own similar evaluations. If multiple high risk industries can 
utilize some of the same off-the-shelf equipment and the same evaluations it will 
likely result in a mutually beneficial situation for all members involved. The 
manufacturer will be able to become proficient at dealing with these industries’ 
non-typical requirements and also distribute the cost of their extra effort to a 
larger customer base. At the same time, the industry equipment users will benefit 
from manufacturers who are more effective with meeting their technical and 
quality related needs, and will benefit from the manufacturer being able to 
provide this type of equipment at lower prices. Basically the industries will get 
better equipment at better pricing while the manufacturer gets more customers 
that want the products they are selling, with a minimal increase in oversight 
activities such as audits and external design reviews. 
To achieve this goal, there are many details that must be worked out. The 
industries must understand each other in how they are different and how they are 
the same. The criteria for these comparison include how classification of 
equipment is handled, how random failures are defended against, how 
systematic faults are prevented, and how off-the-shelf equipment is evaluated for 
suitability. This knowledge is critical to understand when evaluations and 
operating experience can be extrapolated and when they cannot. Another detail 
is that a vehicle of standardization must be in place between the industries and 
the manufacturers to clearly communicate the expected safety and reliability 
targets. The level of rigor can vary greatly within these topics, especially when 
software development is involved, so standardizing what is expected is crucial in 
order to avoid great frustration from both the industries’ perspective and the 




equipment have been significant in recent years, and hold great promise in their 
value to users. But at the same time, the increase in complexity of individual 
components has considerably increased the effort and level of difficulty involved 
in performing the evaluations for confirming suitability. 
In order to deal with many of these details a process of certifying 
equipment to meet IEC 61508 Functional Safety Standards has been 
established. At this point in time, it is a widely under-utilized process and holds 
great potential as it becomes better understood and more widely implemented. 
IEC 61508 provides insight both for the industries using the safety systems and 
also for the manufacturers designing and building the equipment. The goal of this 
thesis is to make this potential better understood and also to provide some 
examples of how it can be accomplished. 
Planning to use commercially developed, digital, COTS equipment in 
safety systems is criticized in some industries as being a very risky and 
unpredictable endeavor. The US Department of Defense (DOD) identifies these 
risks as being: • Potential for limited development, test, or configuration control 
documentation  
• Unknown development history (standards, quality assurance, test, 
analysis, failure history, etc.) 
• Unavailability of design and test data (drawings, test cases and 
procedures, test results, etc.) 
• Proprietary design prohibitions  
• Unable to modify based on limited proprietary or data rights 
• Unknown functionality and functional limitations (operational, 
environmental, stress, etc.) 
• Limited or no supportability from the developer or vendors 
(configuration control, tech support, updates, etc.) 
• Unnecessary functionality or capabilities (the potential of “hidden” or 
undocumented functionality) 
• Potential obsolescence of the COTS application 
• May not be developed to best industry or Government practices or 
certification criteria 
• Unavailability of safety analyses for the COTS application 
• Potential for increased test and analysis required for safety verification, 
safety release, or safety certification 
• Potential need for periodic updates and the unknown impact of those 
updates  
• Functions or tasks unneeded by the intended program 
• Unable to modify due to licensing requirements, or the purchase of the 
license agreement [1] 
The US nuclear industry also makes the following statements about the prospect 
of using digital COTS equipment, “Make sure you understand what you’re signing 




cost/benefit assessments. The evaluation and acceptance activities can easily 
cost far more than the digital device [2].” There is a general understanding that 
very little can be assumed about the characteristics of the designing and 
manufacturing processes of a commercial manufacturer. They may or may not 
have a formal and documented quality assurance program. They may or may not 
implement a structured hardware and software design process. They may or may 
not evaluate the reliability of their products. They may or may not perform and 
document verification and validation activities of their hardware and software 
designs. They may or may not take adequate steps to prevent systematic design 
flaws from being present in their equipment. All of these factors contribute to the 
recognized risk of using digital COTS equipment. 
This thesis will focus on two points. The first point is the need for 
standardization of functional safety requirements. This is important for clear 
communication of expectations between various industries and equipment 
manufacturers. Also, the case will be made for IEC 61508 as being that 
necessary standard. The second point will be to demonstrate that many of the 
risks associated with the selection of COTS equipment can be mitigated by using 
commercial vendors who have pursued IEC 61508 safety integrity level (SIL) 
certification of their products. The results of this thesis will show that when a 
manufacturer’s product is certified as being SIL 2 or higher by a trusted third 
party it becomes reasonable to make some assumptions about the adequacy of 
the design and manufacturing processes that the manufacturer is implementing.  
Other issues such as technology obsolesce and counterfeit parts are 
acknowledged to be relevant to the manufacturing processes of commercial 
equipment, but will not be expanded on as part of this work. Instead, the focus 
will be on the evaluation of suitability in terms of the design and related design 
processes of the equipment. There is certainly sufficient scope of concerns for 
the manufacturing processes to warrant future work in that area, but it is thought 
to be most impactful to focus on the design aspects at this point in time. 
There are a couple of additional notes that should be mentioned. First, the 
author of this thesis has a natural bias towards the nuclear industry since that is 
where most of his work experience is from. An attempt will be made to broaden 
observations and viewpoints to apply to a wider scope. Second, it is critical to 
understand that discussions of instrumentation and controls equipment should be 
interpreted as embedded computer systems, where both hardware and software 
(aka firmware) are required to function correctly for the overall device to function 
correctly. Third, the topics of reliability and correctness of equipment is split into 
two separate discussions, throughout this thesis, because some types of 
equipment failures occur without the failure of any hardware subcomponents. All 
of the subcomponents could be reliable but the equipment could still fail. In these 
situations the failure is due to a lack of correctness and not due to poor reliability. 
A lack of correctness is what will often be referred to as a systematic fault. 
The format of this paper is that chapter two provides an overview of the 




three expands on the literature review of the industry specific laws, standards, 
and guides to provide insight into how each handles safety system equipment. 
Chapter four identifies the relevant similarities and differences between these 
industries to provide insight into how they can work together and how they 
cannot. The existence of similarities between the industries provides evidence in 
the value of uniting behind a standardization of functional safety requirements to 
interact with equipment manufacturers. Chapter five presents examples of digital 
COTS equipment that has been certified to SIL level 2 or higher. The examples 
use publically available literature to show that it is reasonable to expect a higher 
level of rigor in the design of equipment from these manufacturers who have 




CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review was performed with the initial purpose of ensuring that 
existing work and knowledge in this subject matter area was utilized and to also 
ensure this effort was an original work, not duplicating existing efforts. To this 
end, the following databases were searched: IEEE Explore, IAEA- INIS, 
DODSSP (Dept. of Defense Single Stock Point) [Assistdocs.com], and Google 
Scholar. Table 2.1 contains the most relevant results. Several useful resources 
were identified and it was confirmed the planned new work would be an original 
effort.  
The second purpose of the literature review was to gather laws, 
standards, and guidance from industries that utilize digital instrumentation and 
controls equipment to manage significant risk and develop an understanding of 
how each industry handles safety system equipment. Four specific aspects of 
each industry were included in these industry reviews. Those categories are 
classification of systems and components, defending against random failures, 
preventing systematic faults, and suitability evaluations of off-the-shelf 
equipment. 
The IEC 61508 standard was included in these categorical literature 
reviews as a non-industry specific reference. Regarding the topic of 
classification, the IEC 61508 safety integrity levels (SILs) are not actually a part 
of a classification methodology and therefore have been excluded from Table 
2.2. SILs are described in more detail in chapter three, but in summary, they are 
an indicator of the design integrity of the certified equipment and the associated 
design activities.  
Additionally Table 2.3 addresses random failures and Table 2.4 addresses 
systematic faults. Table 2.5 addresses the suitability evaluations of off-the-shelf 
equipment, but several terms are necessary to be understood to trace this topic 
through the identified documents. The actual evaluation is referred to as a proven 
in use evaluation, a prior use evaluation, suitability evaluation, or commercial 
grade dedication. The equipment involved is referred to as pre-existing, pre-
developed, commercial grade, COTS, or non-developmental items. These terms 
should be considered as interchangeable and the text of this thesis will trend 
towards the use of suitability evaluation and off-the-shelf equipment. There are 
exceptions since sometimes it is helpful to use the terminology that matches the 






Table 2.1. Most Similar Works  
The documents in this table are the most similar works identified that are related to the 
comparison of industries that mitigate significant risk using digital instrumentation and 
controls equipment 
Existing Work Summary of Evaluation 
Nuclear Use of I&C Equipment 
Certified for Commercial Safety Use [3] 
Author: Gary Johnson 
This was a high level presentation but identifies some of the core ideas this new work is focused on calling attention to and demonstrating. This new work is 
intended to do some of the tasks that this presentation called for. 
Comparison of IEC and IEEE standards for computer-based 
control systems important to safety [4] Author: Gary Johnson 
This was very relevant and very helpful information that I used as foundational work for my literature 
comparison work. It did not use the same categories of comparison, but it is a more comprehensive look at the two nuclear frameworks. 
US NRC NUREG/CR-7007 Diversity Strategies for 
Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control 
Systems [5] Author: Richard T. Wood 
In an effort to better understand common cause failures, several non-nuclear industries were 
researched to determine best practices. The new work is intended to loosely follow this model in an effort to 
focus on the topic of off the shelf equipment. 
Comparison of the Software Safety Criteria between IEC and IEEE Standards for the 
Digital Instrumentation and Control System [6] 
Authors: Jang-soo Lee, Kee-choon Kwon 
This work appeared to be very relevant but was very high level. It described an on-going effort without much detail. An effort was made to find a follow-up paper that 
might provide better detail but none was found. 
Software Safety and Reliability- Techniques, 
Approaches, and Standards of Key Industrial Sectors [7] 
Author: Debra S. Herrmann 
Presented concepts of both safety and reliability and explains the difference between the terms. It provides good basic background information for various 
industries where instrumentation and controls equipment is used to mitigate significant risk. This work 
did not perform any comparisons related to the topics addressed in this new work. 
A methodology for evaluating, comparing, and selecting 
software safety and reliability standards [8] Author: Debra S. Herrmann 
This work was focused on the selection of safety standards from the perspective of the US FDA 20 
years ago. There were some interesting insights but was not overall relevant to this new work due to its focus and age. 
The potential for a generic 
approach to certification of safety critical systems in the 
transportation sector [9] Authors: Y. Papadopoulos, John A. McDermid 
The concept was similar to this new work but the focus was on railway, automotive and aerospace sectors. 
This new work was planned to include nuclear power plants and it was not expected that there would be 
much instrumentation and controls equipment shared between transportation and nuclear power generation industries. Therefore this work was not considered very 





Table 2.2. Documents Regarding Classification 
The documents identified in this table address the topic of the classification of systems and equipment for the specified industries. 
Process Industry US (IEEE) Nuclear International (IEC) Nuclear US Department of Defense 
 ISA 84.00.01 Part 3 [10]  IEEE 603 Criteria for Safety Systems [11] 
 IAEA SSG-30 Safety Classification [12]  IEC 61226 Classification [13] 
 MIL-STD-882E Standard 




Table 2.3. Documents Regarding Random Failures 
The documents identified in this table address the topic of random failures for the specified industry and the non-industry specific 
standards 
Non-Industry Specific Process Industry US (IEEE) Nuclear International (IEC) Nuclear US Department of Defense 
 IEC 61508 Part 2 [15]  ISA 84.00.01 Part 1 [16] 
 IEEE 603 Criteria for Safety 
Systems [11]  IEEE 7-4.3.2 Criteria for 
Computers in Safety Systems [17]  IEEE 379 Single Failure 
Criterion [18]  IEEE 577 Reliability Analysis 
in Design and Operation [19]  IEEE 352 Principles of 
Reliability Analysis [20] 
 IAEA SSR-2/1 Safety 
of Nuclear Power Plants: Design [21]  IEC 61513 General Requirements [22]  IEC 60987 Computer Based Hardware [23] 
 
 MIL-STD-882E 
Standard Practice for System Safety [14]  Joint Software 








Table 2.4. Documents Regarding Systematic Faults 
The documents identified in this table address the topic of systematic faults for the specified industry or non-industry specific standard 
Non-Industry Specific Process Industry US (IEEE) Nuclear International (IEC) Nuclear US Department of Defense 
 IEC 61508 Part 
2 [15]  IEC 61508 Part 
3 [24] 
 ISA 84.00.01 
Part 1 [16] 
 IEEE 603 Criteria 
for Safety Systems [11]  IEEE 7-4.3.2 Criteria for 
Computers in Safety Systems 
[17] 
 IAEA NS-G-1.3 I&C Systems Important to Safety  IEC 61513 General Requirements [22]  IEC 60987 Computer Based 
Hardware [23]  IEC 60880 Category A Software 
aspects [25]  IEC 62138 Category B or C 
Software aspects [26] 
 MIL-STD-882E 
Standard Practice for System Safety 
[14]  Joint Software 




Table 2.5. Documents Regarding Suitability Evaluations of COTS 
The documents identified in this table address the topic of suitability evaluations of COTS equipment. Common terms to be familiar 
with is commercial graded dedication (CGD), proven in use, and prior use. 
Non-Industry Specific Process Industry US (IEEE) Nuclear International (IEC) Nuclear US Department of Defense 
 IEC 61508 Part 
2 [15]  
 ISA 84.00.01 
Part 1 [16] 
 EPRI NP-5652 R1 Guidance for 
CGD [27]  EPRI TR-106439 Guidance for 
CGD of Digital Equipment[28]  EPRI TR-107339 Guidance for 
CGD of Digital Equipment[2]  EPRI 1011710 Handbook for 
Critical Digital Reviews[29]  IEEE 7-4.3.2 Criteria for 
Computers in Safety Systems [17] 
 IEC 61513 General Requirements [22]  IEC 60987 Computer Based Hardware [23]  IEC 60880 Category A Software aspects [25]  IEC 62138 Category B or 
C Software aspects [26]  IEC 62671 Selection of 
Industrial Digital Devices of Limited Functionality [30] 
 MIL-STD-882E Standard Practice 
for System Safety [14]  Joint Software 






CHAPTER THREE  
MULTI-INDUSTRY SURVEY 
Process Industries 
For process industries such as chemical and oil & gas, the regulatory 
framework is not as defined as for others such as the nuclear industry. These 
industries have taken the initiative to create standards for functional safety and 
unite behind their implementation. The reason for taking the initiative is to avoid 
or delay government regulation by demonstrating that regulation is not needed. 
The perception (and possibly the reality) is that governments move to regulate 
industries in response to the general public perceiving “alarming” associated 
risks [31]. The main standard that was created to address the full lifecycle of 
safety instrumented systems (SIS) was IEC 61508 [32]. Another standard that is 
derived from IEC 61508, specifically for the process industries, is ISA 
84.00.01(IEC 61511) [10], [16], [33]. Despite these self-initiated efforts, regulation 
does exist for many of these process industries and an example of acceptance of 
the industry standards can be found from OSHA who sent a letter to ISA in 2000 identifying, “ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996 as ‘a recognized and generally accepted good 
engineering practice for SIS’ and that if a company is in compliance with the 
standard ‘the employer will be considered in compliance with OSHA PSM 
requirements for SIS’” [31]. 
Concerning regulation of the oil and gas industry, there has become to be 
an extensive list of regulators involved that all seem to be staking out their own 
territory. Here is a list that was reviewed of these regulators: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Main responsibilities. The EPA has primary responsibility for enforcing 
many of the environmental statutes and regulations of the US. 
 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
Main responsibilities. The BLM manages vast stretches of public lands 
that have the potential to make significant contributions to the US' 
renewable energy portfolio. The BLM also manages federal onshore oil, 
gas and coal operations that make significant contributions to the 
domestic energy supply as the US transitions to a clean energy future. 
 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) 
Main responsibilities. BSEE works to promote safety, protect the 
environment, and conserve offshore resources through regulatory 
oversight and enforcement. 
 




Main responsibilities. The BOEM manages the exploration and 
development of the nation's offshore resources. It seeks to appropriately 
balance economic development, energy independence, and 
environmental protection through oil and gas leases, renewable energy 
development and environmental reviews and studies. 
 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
Main responsibilities. FERC is an independent agency that regulates the 
inter-state transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil. FERC also 
reviews proposals to build LNG terminals and inter-state natural gas 
pipelines as well as licensing hydropower projects. 
 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
Main responsibilities. PHMSA's mission is to protect people and the 
environment from the risks inherent in transportation of hazardous 
materials, including oil and gas. [34]  
 
Later in the survey of the international nuclear industry, IEC 61508 [32] is 
mentioned as being the parent document to the nuclear standard IEC 61513 [22]. 
That is because IEC 61508 is technically considered an industry independent 
standard. It was originally written to be used as a starting point for all industries 
that utilized safety systems. IEC 61508 is generally viewed as a standard that 
can be voluntarily adopted by equipment manufacturers to use in the design of 
new equipment intended for use in functional safety applications. Since the 
process industry closely adopted the requirements, guidance, and methodologies 
of IEC 61508 it will be surveyed here. Then a closer look will be taken at ISA 
84.00.01(IEC 61511) [10], [16], [33] to review the process industry’s specific 
implementations. 
IEC 61508 
This standard is a seven part document. Those parts are general 
requirements (part 1) [32], requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic safety-related systems (part 2) [15], software requirements (part 3) 
[24], definitions and abbreviations (part 4) [35], examples of methods for the 
determination of SILs(part 5) [36], guidelines on the application of IEC 61508-2 
and IEC 61508-3 (part 6) [37], overview of techniques and measures (part 7) 
[38]. This survey focuses on parts 1, 2, and 3 as they are the core of the 
requirements. 
The IEC 61508 standard is laid out to explicitly specify the use of a life 
cycle methodology for the design, operation, and maintaining of safety systems. 
Part 1 describes the life cycle for overall plant safety. The overall plant life cycle 
phases are concept, overall scope and definition, hazard and risk analysis, 
overall safety requirements, safety requirements allocation, overall planning, 




validation, overall operation maintenance and repair, overall modification and 
retrofit, and decommissioning or disposal.  
Part 1 also defines the use of SILs as an indicator of the level of rigor that 
went into establishing the integrity of the design of the equipment. The higher the 
SIL the higher the reliability targets are and the more rigorous the requirements 
are for the associated design process. The standard lays out the use of four 
SILs. SIL 1 is defined as ≥10-2 to < 10-1 average probability of a dangerous failure 
per hour, SIL 2 is ≥10-3 to < 10-2, SIL 3 is ≥10-4 to < 10-3, and SIL 4 is ≥10-5 to < 
10-4 for low demand mode of operation. For high demand or continuous mode of 
operation, SIL 1 is defined as ≥10-6 to < 10-5 average probability of a dangerous 
failure per hour, SIL 2 is ≥10-7 to < 10-6, SIL 3 is ≥10-8 to < 10-7, and SIL 4 is ≥10-9 
to < 10-8. The standard also acknowledges that these quantitative definitions 
focus on random hardware failures and are not directly relatable to systematic 
faults. It is further stated that it is necessary for additional qualitative definition to 
be added to the SIL levels in order to make them fully implementable[32]. 
Part 1 is focused on high level programmatic issues and points to parts 2 
and 3 to address specific requirements for the realization of the actual hardware 
and software that make up the equipment used to implement the safety systems.  
Part 2 of IEC 61508 [15] is focused on requirements for hardware and 
covers design measures for defending against both random failures and 
systematic faults. Part 2 also continues the embracing of the implementation of 
the lifecycle approach for hardware and identifies how Part 2 defines the 
realization phase mentioned in Part 1 with a much greater level of detail. The 
phases covered by Part 2 are safety requirements specification, safety validation 
planning, design and development (software is covered in Part 3 [24]), 
integration, installation commissioning operation and maintenance procedures, 
safety validation. These phases are intended to be specific to a certain safety 
system. Each safety system being realized will move through these phases 
independent of other safety systems. 
The specification of the safety requirements phases is intended to be 
comprehensive. Beyond the expected functionality requirements, it is also 
expected that compatibility for the expected environmental extremes will be 
addressed (including electromagnetic compatibility). Typically the expected 
environmental extremes will encompass process industry parameters but does 
not make an effort to cover all possible extremes for other industries, such as 
nuclear power generation. Also hardware reliability goals corresponding to the 
SILs should be specified [15]. 
Several methods are identified as being potentially utilized to 
model/analyze hardware reliability. Those methods included cause consequence 
analysis, fault tree analysis, Markov models, and reliability block diagrams. 
These methods are how quantitative reliability goals can be shown to be 
achieved [15]. 
Another aspect of the life cycle process implementation worth noting is the 




methodology is only applied to software to ensure it meets its design 
requirements but it does make sense to utilize it for hardware also. It is a very 
practical approach to ensure requirements are being met. And for further 
clarification, the final validation of the hardware is performed with any associated 
software loaded into the programmable devices. This allows for functional 
requirements of the system to be more thoroughly validated in a manner that 
proves the hardware and software work together properly [15]. 
The appendices of Part 2 address issues related to detecting and 
controlling failures (random and systematic) during operation of the safety 
system and avoiding failures during different phases of the life cycle. Appendix A 
identifies a wide range of methods for achieving high levels of diagnostic 
coverage within the system hardware to ensure failures are identified and that no 
unsafe conditions are allowed to go undetected until they cause major problems. 
This appendix also presents various methods for managing detected failures by 
either working around them or correcting the erroneous condition. The 
methodologies presented include topics such as redundancy and diversity [15]. 
Part 3 focuses on the software requirements aspects, and steps through 
the software specific life cycle phases. These phases are software safety 
requirements specification, software safety validation planning, software design 
and development, programmable electronics (PE) integration, software operation 
and modification procedures, and software safety validation. The specific 
requirements for each of these phases are identified throughout section 7 of Part 
3 [24].  
The appendices of Part 3 provide lists of techniques and methods that can 
be selected to reach the desired safety integrity level. For each technique and 
method it is indicated as highly recommended, recommended, impartial, or not 
recommended for each safety integrity level. This information is presented in 
tabular format throughout appendices A, B, and C that provides a very useful tool 
for the planning phase of a project [24].  
ISA 84.00.01(IEC 61511 Mod) 
The International Society of Automation’s standard on process safety has 
experienced an evolution over the years and the current version is mostly an 
adoption of the IEC 61511 standard. ISA 84.00.01 is a three part standard  and is 
the process industry’s specific implementation of IEC 61508 [32]. The common 
practice in the process industries is expected to be that manufacturers of safety 
instrumented system equipment will mainly utilize IEC 61508 while the process 
industry end users mainly utilize ISA 84.00.01 (IEC 61511 Mod). The bulk of the 
requirements are in Part 1 [16] of ISA 84.00.01 so this survey will focus on that 
section. Part 2 [33] covers guidelines for the application of Part 1, and Part 3 [10] 
provides guidance on the evaluation of risk in order to determine the appropriate 
safety integrity level to be specified. This evaluation includes a discussion of 





Part 1 of this standard covers framework, definitions, system, and 
hardware and software requirements for SIS. More specifically, it discusses 
management of functional safety, safety life-cycle requirements, verification, 
process hazard and risk assessment, allocation of safety functions to protection 
layers, SIS safety requirements specification, SIS design and engineering, 
requirements for application software, including selection criteria for utility 
software, factory acceptance testing, SIS installation and commissioning, SIS 
safety validation, SIS operation and maintenance, SIS modification, SIS 
decommissioning, and information and documentation requirements [16]. 
Because of the expected audience of this standard being end users and 
not manufacturers, the discussions are less detailed concerning individual 
components than the corresponding discussions in IEC 61508. Instead, the 
discussions are focused on the implementation of SIS’s from a higher level, plant 
system perspective. A specific example of this is the topic of hazard and risk 
assessments. The end user has an advantage over the manufacturer in this area 
because the scope of potential applications of equipment can be reduced. This is 
because the end user knows how and where the equipment will be used and 
what the overall architecture of the system will be. A manufacturer intentionally 
keeps the scope of potential applications very broad so that they can sell their 
equipment to more customers [16].  
In order to maintain harmony between IEC 61508 and ISA 84.00.01(IEC 
61511 Mod) the overall framework of IEC 61508 is maintained in ISA 84.00.01. 
For example, the safety integrity level scheme (SIL 1, 2, 3, & 4) remains exactly 
the same. One interesting note from ISA 84.00.01 regarding SILs is that the 
application of SIL 4 criteria is considered very unusual in the process industry 
and it is recommended to attempt to redesign a system to reduce its safety 
significance to a lower SIL before embarking on an effort to implement a system 
at SIL 4. It is further noted that SIL 4 is considered to be very difficult to achieve 
and maintain. 
Part 3 of ISA 84.00.01 describes the allowed methodologies for classifying 
equipment. These methodologies are similar in the manner of increasing 
requirements based on the importance of a specific safety system to the overall 
safety of the plant. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are allowed for 
determining the SIL that will be required for a particular safety system. The 
concept of SILs can be confusing as it is not considered an equipment 
classification system in that it is not categorizing equipment based on the risk 
that is associated with them. Instead, it is standardizing a level of rigor to be 
applied to establishing the evidence of equipment’s design integrity. Figure 3.1 
illustrates this concept. 
The design requirements for SIS include built in features to defend against 
random and systematic failures. Some of these requirements involve system 
behavior on detection of a fault (e.g., includes the use of self-diagnostics) and 
hardware fault tolerance. The detection of faults is identified as potentially being 






 Figure 3.1. SIL Standardization 
This is an illustration of the standardizing role SILs play between the classification of 




response to the detection of a fault varies based on the fault tolerance of the 
system. A response may range from a warning light illuminating to planned, 
systematic actions for the safe shutdown of the entire system. Hardware fault 
tolerance is defined as, “the ability of a component or subsystem to continue to 
be able to undertake the required safety instrumented function in the presence of 
one or more dangerous faults in hardware. A hardware fault tolerance of 1 
means that there are, for example, two devices and the architecture is such that 
the dangerous failure of one of the two components or subsystems does not 
prevent the safety action from occurring.” [16] 
In ISA 84.00.01, an assumption seems to be made within the SIS 
requirements section that alludes to the option of selecting off-the-shelf (OTS) or 
pre-existing equipment. There are discussions of components designed and 
manufactured using IEC 61508, but there are also discussions of justifying the 
use of components based on prior use. The scenario involving prior use is 
assumed to be for equipment that was not designed and manufactured using IEC 
61508 [16]. 
Several factors are identified as being necessary evidence for the 
determination of suitability for components based on prior use. These factors are 
identified as follows: consideration of the manufacturer’s quality, management, 
and configuration management systems, adequate identification and 
specification of the components or subsystems, demonstration of the 
performance of the components or subsystems in similar operating profiles and 
physical environments, and the volume of the operating experience. These 




manufactured using IEC 61508, but it is understood that the higher the SIL that is 
needing to be achieved, the harder it is to achieve by using a prior use basis [16].  
Additionally, on the topic of selection of components and subsystems for 
use within SISs, an aspect that appears to streamline their implementation for the 
process industry is that there are several components and subsystems that are 
certified as having been designed and manufactured to the requirements of IEC 
61508 [39]. This results in having several suitable options available “off the shelf” 
or pre-existing. That is unique for most industries that use instrumentation and 
control equipment to mitigate significant risks. 
The software requirements addressed in ISA 84.00.01 are limited to the 
application software that is developed using a fixed program language (FPL) or 
limited variability language (LVL) for up to SIL 3 SISs. This is consistent with the 
understanding of the target audience being process industry end users and not 
equipment manufacturers. Readers are referred to Part 3 of IEC 61508 for 
coverage of utility software (software development tools), embedded software 
(platform software supplied with the equipment from the manufacturer), and 
application software written using a full variability language (FVL) or is intended 
for use in a SIL 4 SIS [16].  
Within this limited scope, the realization phase of the application software 
life cycle is described as consisting of the requirements specification, validation 
planning, design configuration and simulation, integration, and operation and 
modification procedures. For these specific topic areas, the content is consistent 
with corresponding sections of IEC 61508 Part 3, but emphasizes the role of the 
system integrator, end user, or plant design engineering group [16]. 
Commercial Nuclear Power Generation 
General 
Since the first nuclear power plant was connected to the commercial utility 
power grid in 1954 at Obninsk, USSR [40], the commercial nuclear power 
generation industry has been highly regulated. This is mostly due to it being 
inherently related to the most powerful weapon currently known to man, the 
nuclear bomb. The aspect of nuclear fission of being able to release very large 
amounts of energy both make it very beneficial and also make it potentially very 
harmful. Over time, heavy regulation was also supported by accidents 
experienced in commercial nuclear power plants such as the Three Mile Island, 
Chernobyl, and Fukushima [41]. These accidents demonstrated the potential 
harm involved in utilizing this technology.  
Regulation is mainly a nation by nation activity but efforts have been made 
to move it up to an international level.  In 1996, the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
(CNS) was formed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The CNS 
was focused on, “to legally commit participating States operating land-based 
nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international 




Parties’ common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which will be 
developed and promoted through regular meetings. The Convention obliges 
Parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for ‘peer 
review’ at meetings of the Parties to be held at the IAEA.” [42]. At this point in 
time, 78 nations have joined the CNS. Each individual nation remains 
independently responsible for establishing or endorsing the laws, rules, and 
standards that nuclear power plants must meet, but through the CNS, each 
nation is responsible to ensure that their regulatory program meets a universally 
accepted set of safety principles. 
Because of the focus on the individual nations, this survey will be 
structured to review a select group of nation’s programs implemented to ensure 
safety of nuclear instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. A group of 
applicable international standards will be reviewed initially independent of a 
particular nation, followed by a discussion to identify whether the international 
standards are utilized during the review of each nations’ laws and standards. 
International Standards Structure 
The international standards organization applicable to the safety of 
nuclear I&C systems is the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The 
IEC has a set of standards created by its subcommittee 45A of technical 
committee 45: Nuclear Instrumentation. The parent standard in this hierarchy of 
documents is IEC 61513 [22]. This document presents the broad collection of 
design aspects involved in nuclear I&C safety systems without going into detail, 
but instead presents a high level road map. There are several daughter 
standards that cover specific topics in the necessary detail (only a subset is 
described in this survey). See Figure 3.2 for more detail on the IEC hierarchy. 
IEC 61513 is also considered the nuclear power industry implementation of IEC 
61508 [15], [24], [32], [35]–[38]; which has been previously described as a non-
industry specific safety standard that was created by the IEC Subcommittee 65A 
of Technical Committee 65. 
The methodology presented by IEC 61513 [22] is structured into a layered 
lifecycle approach. It is intended to link the nuclear power plant’s (NPP) overall 
safety requirements to the safety requirements of the individual I&C systems. 
Figure 3 of the standard provides an interesting visual illustration of the aspects 
of systematic faults versus random failures. This standard lays the framework to 
address both types of concerns. The aspects of assessing reliability focus on 
defending against random failures, while the majority of life cycle phases focus 
on the elimination of systematic faults. 
The top layer is the overall plant I&C safety. Phases included in this 
overall plant I&C safety life cycle are as follows: review of the plant safety design 
base, definition of the overall requirements specification, design of the overall 
I&C architecture and assignment of functions to individual systems and 
equipment, overall planning, realization of individual systems, overall system 
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of design of the overall I&C architecture is where the use of hazard analysis is 
incorporated to ensure the requirements are properly defined. The overall design 
phase is also where principles such as defense against common cause failure is 
incorporated. During the overall planning phase is where system security is 
addressed and planned for [22].  
The lower layer is system safety life cycle. Phases include in this life cycle 
are system requirements specification, system specification, detailed design and 
implementation, integration, validation, installation, and modification. The system 
specification phases is where the treatment of pre-existing (i.e., COTS) 
equipment is addressed through the description of a suitability analysis. Several 
other safety principles are addresses within this life cycle layer such as 
independence of redundant channels, additional defense against CCF, and 
reliability assessments. For additional hardware requirements, IEC 60987 [23] is 
pointed to throughout this lifecycle layer. For requirements specific to software, 
IEC 60880 [25] and IEC 62138 [26] are referenced throughout this life cycle layer 
[22]. 
This standard also provides guidance concerning the quality assurance 
program that should be used by the entity designing and manufacturing the 
safety system or component. This guidance generally pointed to ISO and to IAEA 
GS-R-3 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 [22]. 
The first daughter standard that needs to be considered covers the topic 
of classification and lays the framework for implementing a graded approach to 
the design of I&C safety systems. This standard is IEC 61226 [13] and prescribes 
three function categories (A, B, and C), and three equipment classes (1, 2, and 
3). Categorizing I&C functions is described as mainly being a deterministic 
process (supplemented with probabilistic techniques when appropriate), using 
descriptions of what types of safety functions fit into each category. These 
categories are laid out in a defense-in-depth format with Category C being the 
first layer of safety and Category A as being the final and most critical layer [13]. 
These categories are used by the rest of the standards in the series to identify 
the requirements that apply to the systems performing the functions that fall into 
each of the categories. The equipment classification is then set by the category 
of the function it will be performing. Namely, Class 1 equipment can perform 
category A, B, or C functions. Class 2 equipment is limited to performing 
category B and C functions. Class 3 equipment is further limited to only 
performing category C functions. This correlation between categories and 
classes is shown in Table 2 of IEC 61513 [22].  
To address computer-system hardware requirements for class 1 and 2 
equipment there is IEC 60987 [23]. Class 3 equipment does not have any 
additional requirements beyond what is considered typical for normal commercial 
grade. Topics covered in this standard are design, verification and validation, 
environmental qualification, manufacture, installation, maintenance, modification, 
operation, reliability/availability, and use of pre-existing hardware. Overall, this 




availability, environmental withstand, and documentation requirements following 
a top down approach where the equipment is designed to meet the requirements. 
One method identified for addressing reliability is the use of hazard analysis. Two 
specific methods mentioned are fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and 
effect analysis (FMEA). 
This standard also addresses the increasingly common situation where 
pre-existing equipment is utilized. These situations force more of a bottom up 
derivation of requirements. In order to utilize this pre-existing equipment, 
requirements must be carefully specified in a manner that allows the equipment 
to be acceptable while also maintaining all of the overall safety requirements of 
the nuclear power plant (NPP). 
There are two standards that address software requirements for safety 
equipment. IEC 60880 [25] addresses equipment that will be used to perform 
category A functions (class 1). This standard describes the life cycle phases for 
the development, use, and modification of the software used in this class of 
equipment. It also addresses the qualification of pre-developed software (also 
known as commercial off the shelf), and includes what is described as a 
suitability analysis. Software design concepts that are covered include derivation 
of requirements, system security, incorporation of self-diagnostics, response to 
detected faults, use of modular source code, programming best practices, 
treatment of software development tools, and defense against common cause 
failure. Software verification topics described were desired characteristics of 
verification personnel, development and use of a plan, use of code inspections, 
use of analysis (potentially with automated tools), and use of tests.  
IEC 62138 [26] addresses equipment that will perform category B (class 2) 
and/or category C (class 3) functions. Three different types of software systems 
are described; human machine interface (HMI), automation and control, and 
service systems. These types are described as also being able to be broken 
down into previously developed (typically system software) and new software 
(typically application software). For these types of equipment, a lifecycle 
approach is described that is less rigorous than what is described in IEC 60880 
but still ensures adequate assurance of safety is maintained. As such, the 
methodologies described in this standard are molded to be more explicitly 
achievable for pre-existing systems. 
The topic of environmental qualification, the process of verifying that 
equipment will withstand the environmental conditions they will be exposed to in 
their application within the nuclear plant, are addressed by a collection of 
standards with the overall standard being IEC 60780 [43]. There are several 
lower-tiered standards used to cover the various aspect of this topic. Two 
examples are IEC 60980 [44] for addressing resistance to seismic events and 
IEC 62003 [45] to address electromagnetic compatibility.  
The final daughter standard to be discussed is IEC 62645 [46]. This 
standard covers the requirements to be met for security programs of computer 




levels of security classifications. These levels are completely different from the 
safety classifications described in IEC 61226; they are referred to as security 
degrees instead of security classifications and are identified as S1, S2, and S3. 
The standard includes a description of a life cycle process and identifies how 
security must be worked into all phases, including design, operation, and 
retirement. 
United States of America 
The first specific country’s laws, regulatory framework, consensus 
standards, and industry guidance to be surveyed is the United States of America. 
The original legislation related to nuclear power was the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954. This Act created the Atomic Energy Commission and resulted in provided 
general principles and concepts but left the regulation enforcement open ended. 
This was later addressed by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. This Act 
dissolved the Atomic Energy Commission and established the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC has been the regulating body of 
commercial nuclear power ever since [47].  
To regulate the licensing of commercial nuclear reactors the NRC has 
established two laws. The first was Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
Part 50 [48] (10 CFR Part 50). This licensing approach involved two parts: a 
construction permit and an operating license, and is assumed to have been 
originally established in the late 1970s. All currently operating US commercial 
nuclear reactors used this methodology [47].  
The second law was 10 CFR Part 52 [49] and was established in 1989. 
This approach allows for the use of certified designs and combined construction 
and operation licenses [47] . Most of the new US plants currently under 
construction are using this approach because it is thought to reduce risk of not 
being able to obtain the operating license after construction is completed [50]. 
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B [51] provides the requirements for the quality 
assurance programs that must be implemented at nuclear facilities and at vendor 
facilities who are supplying parts, systems, and services to the nuclear plants. 
One method established to meet the requirements of this law is the industry 
consensus standard ASME NQA-1 [52] which provides additional details for the 
implementation of a nuclear quality assurance program. 
10 CFR Part 21 [53] establishes requirements for the reporting of defects 
and noncompliance. These requirements are typically applicable to all US 
nuclear power plants and any vendor that is interacting with parts and/or systems 
that are classified as safety related within their nuclear power plant application. 
To specifically address the requirements of safety systems, the NRC issued 
Regulatory Guide 1.152 (currently at Revision 3) [54] to endorse the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) standard 603 [11]. This standard 
addresses a similar scope as IEC 61513 [22] by addressing safety system design 
requirements at an overall high level, but at this point in time, the NRC does not 




relationship between the NRC and the IEEE. See Figure 3.3 for more detail 
about the IEEE standards. IEEE 603 originally existed long before IAEA NS-G-
1.3 or IEC 61513 and the IEEE standards are the primary consensus documents 
used by the NRC. Regulatory Guide 1.152 Revision 3 goes on to also endorse 
IEEE 7-4.3.2 [17] to specifically address safety systems that involve the use of 
computers. IEEE 7-4.3.2 covers, at a high level, a similar scope as IEC 60987, 
IEC 60880, and IEC 62138, but once again the NRC does not currently endorse 
any of those IEC standards at this point in time. 
IEEE 603 is not explicitly specific to instrumentation and controls as it 
covers the power systems as well. This standard presents safety system criteria 
that influences the safety system through all or certain phases of its life cycle, but 
the standard does not prescribe a specific life cycle format to be followed [11]. 
This standard addresses classification of equipment in a very deterministic 
and simple manner. Classification is made up of two categories: Class 1E and 
Non-class 1E. The definition of Class 1E is “The safety classification of the 
electric equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor 
shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and 
reactor heat removal, or are otherwise essential in preventing significant release 
of radioactive material to the environment.” The Class 1E classification considers 
equipment involved in performing any of the functions listed above. If it is not 
involved in performing any of those functions then it is Non-class 1E [11]. 
A safety system is described as being able to be divided into three components: 
sense and command, execute, and power sources. The standard first addresses 
general safety system criteria that is applicable to all three safety system 
components. One of the principles defined is the single-failure criterion. This is the 
concept that no one failure should be able to cause the safety system to fail overall to 
perform its Class 1E function. Analysis of the single failure criterion is intended to be 
deterministic, but an allowance is made for the use of a probabilistic assessment to 
eliminate any events or failures that are not credible (realistically impossible). Another 
principle is quality. This concept is focused on achieving minimal maintenance and 
low random hardware failure rates. The standard points to ASME NQA-1 [52] for 
guidance on the use of a quality assurance program, and points to IEEE 7-4.3.2 [17] 
for systems using digital technology. The next principle to note is equipment 
qualification. This concept is that safety system equipment shall be capable of 
functioning properly within the environmental conditions it will encounter when 
installed within the nuclear power plant. The standard points to IEEE 323 [55] for 
additional requirements related to this principle. Then there is the principle of 
independence. This refers to the requirement of independence between redundant 
portions of a safety system and independence between safety systems and other 
systems. This principle is important because, if proper independence is not 
maintained, the safety system’s resistance to single failures preventing the safety 
function may be lower than what is established in the safety system analyses. 
Another principle is reliability. Qualitative or quantitative reliability goals set for the 
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reliability must be implemented and IEEE 7-4.3.2 is pointed to for determining 
reliability of a system that involves computers. The last principle to be discussed 
is common-cause failure. This concept provides criteria for protecting the safety 
system from failing due to simultaneous systematic faults in multiple redundant 
portions of the system [11]. 
One issue that this standard does not address is how pre-existing (i.e., 
COTS) equipment should be assessed for suitability to be used in the safety 
system. Another issue to note as being not addressed is that, beyond the 
discussion of control of access, security is not discussed. 
IEEE 7-4.3.2 [17] is set up to amplify the requirements of IEEE 603 [11] in 
the areas that require additional information to address the use of computers in 
the safety system. The principle of quality introduces the safety system life cycle 
concept and includes phases of establishing of system requirements, 
development of a detailed design, implementing the design, validating that the 
system performs as required, installation and site acceptance testing, operating 
and maintaining the system, and retiring the system. This principle of quality also 
leads to the issues of software development, use of pre-existing computers, use 
of software tools, verification and validation, configuration management, and risk 
management. Another principle that is enhanced is equipment qualification. An 
explicit note is added to ensure all portions of the system needed for performing 
the safety function are active during qualification by test. The principle of 
independence is expanded extensively to address the many potential interfaces 
computer systems could have. These expansions include buffering 
function/circuit, communication, and data. The issue of security is also 
extensively expanded within the principle of control of access. This section goes 
beyond physical security to get into virus protection, security patches, and the 
implementation of secure development environments into the safety system life 
cycle. Concerning the principle of reliability, the issue of software errors is 
identified as being best dealt with recording and trending their occurrences and 
combining that data with analysis, field experience, and/or testing. The next 
principle to be expanded on is common cause failure. This expansion is 
extensive because this principle is viewed as most impacted by the incorporation 
of computers into safety systems [47]. An analysis that can be used concerning 
common cause failure is a defense in depth (D3) analysis. The addition of 
diversity to the redundant portions of the safety system is identified as an ideal 
way to protect against common cause failures, but detailed analysis of the 
specific equipment to be used is prescribed to ensure there is not a common 
thread in the design development that could result in a common cause failure in 
equipment that appears to be diverse. The final principle that is addressed is the 
determination of suitability of use of digital COTS equipment. The use of 
commercial equipment for performing Class 1E functions involves a process 
called commercial grade dedication and is best described in an industry guidance 
document developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). This 




EPRI NP-5652. A suitability analysis is described that involves performing an 
extensive design review (referred to as a critical digital review). The design 
review involves evaluating the commercial life cycle process used by the 
manufacturer to design and manufacture the equipment. It also involves a hazard 
analysis to study the behavior of the commercial equipment against its interfaces 
to the rest of the safety system. For additional details on performing the suitability 
evaluation (i.e., commercial grade dedication) this standard refers to some other 
industry guidance documents: EPRI TR-106439 [28] and EPRI 1011710 [29]  
As previously mentioned, IEEE 323 [55] addresses equipment 
qualification from a high level. It is aided by several other standards to define the 
many nuances of this topic. One such standard is IEEE 344 [57] to address 
determining an equipment design to be adequately rugged to handle a credible 
earthquake at the nuclear power plant. 
France 
The second country to be surveyed is France. The first action the French 
government took regarding nuclear energy was in 1945 when they created the 
French Atomic Energy Commission. This entity was later renamed the French 
Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in 2010. All 
commercial nuclear reactors in France have been and continue to be built and 
operated by the licensee Électricité de France (EDF). The French nuclear safety 
authority (ASN) was created by the Nuclear Security and Transparency (TSN) 
Act in 2006 in order to better promote transparency and security. The ASN is 
tasked with “monitoring nuclear safety and radiation protection, to protect 
workers, patients, the general public and the environment against the risks 
associated with civil nuclear activities” [58]. The ASN’s focus currently is to 
create basic nuclear installations (BNIs) to promote and explain the ASN 
doctrine. The effort to create BNIs was initiated by the “BNI procedure” decree of 
2007 and is focused on the creation of “a rigorous, comprehensive working 
framework” [58] . The intent is for this framework to be harmonized with the other 
European nations utilizing nuclear power. This harmonization is being driven by 
the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA). A goal of this 
effort is to assure that, “The requirements concerning the safety case to be 
provided by the licensee are broadly based on the IAEA standards” [58]. Drafting 
these safety requirements is the responsibility of the AFCEN (French association 
for rules on design, construction and in-service monitoring of nuclear steam 
supply systems). This group, made up of EDF and Areva NP, is responsible for 
directing compliance with the ASN’s BNIs through the creation of design and 
construction rule (RCC) codes. In order to maintain the trend of harmonization 
with other nuclear powered European nations and the standards of the IAEA, 
these requirements are being drafted to follow the methodologies laid out by IEC 
61513 its numerous daughter IEC standards [59], some of which have been 




Due to the recent creation of the French regulatory framework and 
currently ongoing activities to improve transparency, the specific design 
methodologies implemented in the existing nuclear power plants regarding the 
I&C safety systems is not clear. It appears reasonable to assume that future 
nuclear power plants will implement the design requirements and methodologies 
prescribed in the IEC nuclear I&C collection of standards. 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s primary legislative framework for the regulation of 
the commercial nuclear power industry is made up of the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act of 1974, the Nuclear Installations Act of 1965 (as amended), the 
Radioactive Substances Act of 1993 (RSA93), Environmental Permitting 
(England and Wales) Regulations 2010, Energy Act of 2004, and the Freedom of 
Information Act of 2000. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act of 1974 created 
the statutory body of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The Office for 
Nuclear Regulation (ONR) was originally formed in 2012 as a non-statutory 
Agency of the HSE. The ONR’s responsibilities encompass those of the previous 
Nuclear Directorate and the Department for Transport’s Radioactive Materials 
Transport Team of the HSE [60]. On the 18th of December 2013, the Energy Act 
was passed and the ONR was placed “on a statutory footing” [61]. The UK is also 
participates in WENRA and is interested in harmonizing its regulatory frame work 
with the other participating nations and the IAEA standards [60]. 
The desire for harmonization has driven the methodology used in the UK 
for implementing safety systems to the same IEC standards that France and 
much of Europe are moving towards. Thorough the WENRA and in partnership 
with Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Finland a common position has 
been issued that describes the methodologies deemed appropriate for designing 
and implementing safety systems (including systems utilizing software). Included 
in these common positions are the topics of system classes, function categories, 
pre-existing software, tools, security, diversity, and a life cycle approach that 
includes specifications, design, implementation, verification, and validation [62]. 
Regarding system classes and function categories, a deterministic 
approach is utilized. A simplified implementation of the IEC 61226 [13] 
methodology is embraced. Category A as defined by IEC 61226 is implemented 
as safety systems. Categories B and C (according to IEC 61226) are 
implemented as safety related systems. Then equipment performing functions 
that do not fit in any of the IEC 61226 categories is considered as systems not 
important to safety [62]. 
For the topic of pre-existing software (PSW), the common view point is 
shared that not only is the use of such components beneficial for efficiency but 
may also increase confidence in safety [62]. This common position is heavily 
based on IEC 61513, IEC 60880, and IEC 60987 as previously discussed. 
To be able to accept PSW, several aspects are needed to be verified. 




will be required by the host safety system. Second, the extra features contained 
by the PSW cannot prevent the PSW from performing its critical functions 
depended on by the host safety system. Third, if some of the functions of the 
PSW are omitted the host safety system needs to still be able to perform its 
safety function. Fourth, the PSW and its associated development life cycle 
documentation need to be compared to the applicable standards to analysis for 
compliance. Fifth and finally, the critical functions of the PSW depended on by 
the host safety system need to be validated by testing. 
Furthermore regarding PSW, properly documented and relevant 
operational experience can be credited to support claims of dependability. 
Operational experience is viewed as being complementary evidence support 
existing evidence from verification and validation activities that were performed 
on the PSW [62]. 
Concerning the use of software tools, the methodology implemented 
aligns well with IEC 60880. Software tools that have the potential of inserting 
errors into the software product must be validated before they can be accepted 
for use in designing that software product. Approaches to validating tools are 
inspecting the output of the tool for correctness with every use, or certification of 
the tool as being correct [62].  
For the topic of security, the requirements align with IEC 61513 and IEC 
60880 (IEC 62645 did not yet exist when the material being reviewed was 
prepared). The scope of the requirements range from physical security to the 
prevention of access to hackers, and also to the periodic auditing of system 
parameters to prevent an insider threat [62]. 
Regarding diversity, it is seen as a valuable defense against common 
cause failure. While redundancy, by itself, is protection against random hardware 
failures, to add diversity between those redundant channels builds in protection 
against systematic common cause failures. The concept of independence is an 
aspect of diversity. Complete independence between redundant portions of a 
safety system would cover a vast scope from the conceptual design, 
programming language, and software tools to aspects such as physical 
separation and isolated power sources. While it is not required to achieve 
complete independence, an effort must be made to achieve a reasonable level of 
independence and needs to be also coupled with the concept of defense in 
depth. The many aspects of diversity include the following: “functional diversity, 
technology diversity, independent teams for specifying, decomposing and 
deriving requirements, independent development teams with no direct 
communication, independent teams for performing verification and validation, 
different allocation of requirements to software components, different allocation 
of software components to hardware components, different timing and different 
order of execution, simplicity of software design and implementation, different 
description/programming languages and notations, different development 




operating systems, different hardware, diverse verification and validation” [62]. 
This overall concept aligns with IEC 61513 and IEC 60880. 
For the topic of a life cycle approach to specifying, designing, 
implementing, verifying, validating, and then operating safety systems, the 
methodology embraces the concepts of IEC 61513. It is important to focus on the 
steps of specifying the system requirements before jumping into the 
implementation phase. The common tendency of technical personnel is to jump 
into building something but in order to end up with the best end product possible 
it is important to be disciplined and identify the requirements and plan out the 
design. This approach makes it much easier for the design work to be checked 
and/or audited later [62]. 
United States Department of Defense 
The US Department of Defense (DOD) encompasses the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force has roots that go back to 1775 and the American Revolution. The 
DOD’s literature provides this description of its history: The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were established in 1775, in 
concurrence with the American Revolution. The War Department was 
established in 1789, and was the precursor to what is now the Department 
of Defense. 
One year later, in 1790, the Coast Guard (part of Homeland 
Security in peace time) was established. This was followed by the 
founding of the Department of the Navy in 1798. 
The decision to unify the different services under one Department 
led to the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947. This 
establishment would replace the War Department, which converted to the 
Department of the Army. That same year, the U.S. Air Force was 
established followed by the founding of the Department of the Air Force. 
Finally, the three military branches, Army, Navy, and Air Force, 
were placed under the direct control of the new Secretary of Defense, 
confirmed by Senate. 
In 1949, an amendment to the National Security Act further 
consolidated the national defense structure by withdrawing cabinet-level 
status from the three Service secretaries. The National Military 
Establishment was then renamed the Department of Defense [63]. 
The DOD covers a large scope of applications for safety systems and 
mission critical computer applications, and puts extensive effort into the 
development those systems in a manner that allows them to have a very high 
level of correctness, reliability, and security. To this end, the DOD has issued 
several documents on this topic of safety systems and the main documents will 




MIL-STD-882E Standard Practice of System Safety 
This document starts out by defining the main goal as being to eliminate 
hazards when possible and to minimize risks when hazards cannot be 
eliminated. The process for achieving this goal involves 8 elements. Those 
elements are: document the system safety approach, identify and document 
hazards, assess and document risk, identify and document risk mitigation 
measures, reduce risk, verify validate and document risk reduction, accept risk 
and document, and manage life-cycle risk[14]. 
During the assessing and documenting risks process, risks are 
categorized by severity and probability (frequency of occurrence). The probability 
levels are open to being defined as either qualitative or quantitative. Additionally 
it is acknowledged that software risks must be assessed differently. Due to 
inherent differences between the ways that hardware and software fail, predicting 
the probability of failure of software is very difficult and cannot be based on 
historical data. Instead software risks are assessed using software control 
categories along with the severity categories to determine a software criticality 
index (SwCI). The SwCI is then correlated into a level of rigor (LOR) that can be 
used to define what the safety requirements are for the software [14]. 
Concerning classification of equipment, some specific terms are described 
in this standard. Those terms are safety-related, safety-critical, and safety-
significant. Safety-related is “a term applied to a condition, event, operation, 
process, or item whose mishap severity consequence is either Marginal or 
Negligible”. Safety-critical is “a term applied to a condition, event, operation, 
process, or item whose mishap severity consequence is either Catastrophic or 
Critical”. Safety-significant is “a term applied to a condition, event, operation, 
process, or item that is identified as either safety-critical or safety-related”. Even 
though these terms have been defined, their specific meaning will vary based on 
the nature of each specific project. 
Hazard analysis is a significant aspect of the methodology prescribed in 
this standard. The sequence of hazard analyses is the Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), System Requirements Hazard Analysis (SRHA), Subsystem 
Hazard Analysis (SSHA), System Hazard Analysis (SHA), Operating and Support 
Hazard Analysis (O&SHA), Health Hazard Analysis (HHA), Functional Hazard 
Analysis (FHA), System-of-Systems (SoS) Hazard Analysis, and Environmental 
Hazard Analysis (EHA) [14]. 
In summary, this standard does not prescribe the use of any specific 
design architectures or methodologies to achieve safety. Instead, it is focused on 
the elimination and management of the risks involved and drives documentation 
of the specific methodologies that are implemented. It also prescribes the 
verification steps to ensure the implementations comply with the safety 




Joint Software Systems Safety Engineering Handbook 
This handbook is written in a manner to address implementation of 
software system safety (SSS) as a subset within the overall concepts of system 
safety engineering. The implementation of a systems perspective to maintaining 
safety means that a complete view of the components, interfaces, and impacting 
factors is maintained to ensure comprehensive solutions are identified and 
implemented. This approach is in contrast to a methodology that would focus in 
on specific aspects of the system and attempt to design and implement those 
specific components without fully understanding how all the system will ultimately 
end up working together. System safety program requirements are identified as 
including:  Eliminate identified hazards or reduce associated risk through 
design, including material selection or substitution  Isolate hazardous substances, components, and operations from other activities, areas, personnel, and incompatible materials  Locate equipment so that access during operations, servicing, 
maintenance, repair, or adjustment minimizes personnel exposure 
to hazards  Minimize risk resulting from excessive environmental conditions 
(e.g., temperature, pressure, noise, toxicity, acceleration, and 
vibration)  Design to minimize risk created by human error in the operation and support of the system  Consider alternate approaches to minimize risk from hazards that 
cannot be eliminated. Such approaches include interlocks; 
redundancy; fail-safe design; fire suppression; and protective 
clothing, equipment, devices, and procedures  Protect power sources, controls, and critical components of 
redundant subsystems by separation or shielding  Ensure personnel and equipment protection (when alternate design 
approaches cannot eliminate the hazard) provide warning and 
caution notes in assembly, operations, maintenance, and repair 
instructions as well as distinctive markings on hazardous 
components and materials, equipment, and facilities. These shall 
be standardized in accordance with MA (Managing Authority) 
requirements  Minimize severity of personnel injury or damage to equipment in the event of a mishap  Design software-controlled or monitored functions to minimize 
initiation of hazardous events or mishaps [1] 
On the path to eliminating and reducing risk as much as possible, there 
are some general methodologies laid out in an order of precedence. Those are:  Design for Minimum Risk – From the first, design to eliminate 




associated risk to an acceptable level, as defined by the MA, 
through design selection.  Incorporate Safety Devices – If identified hazards cannot be 
eliminated or their associated risk adequately reduced through 
design selection, that risk shall be reduced to a level acceptable to 
the MA through the use of fixed, automatic, or other protective 
safety design features or devices. Provisions shall be made for 
periodic functional checks of safety devices when applicable.  Provide Warning Devices – When neither design nor safety devices can effectively eliminate identified hazards or adequately reduce 
associated risk, devices shall be used to detect the condition and 
produce an adequate warning signal to alert personnel of the 
hazard. Warning signals and their application shall be designed to 
minimize the probability of incorrect personnel reaction to the 
signals and shall be standardized within like types of systems.  Develop Procedures and Training – Where it is impractical to 
eliminate hazards through design selection or adequately reduce 
the associated risk with safety and warning devices, procedures 
and training shall be used. However, without a specific waiver from 
the MA, no warning, caution, or other form of written advisory shall 
be used as the only risk reduction method for Category I or II 
Mishaps. Procedures may include the use of personal protective 
equipment. Precautionary notations shall be standardized as 
specified by the MA. Tasks and activities judged to be safety-critical 
by the MA may require certification of personnel proficiency [1]. 
This handbook intends to address the aspects and roles that software 
plays within the overall system concept. It is also important to note that the 
systems perspective includes the implementation of a life cycle approach to the 
specification, design, implementation, verification, and operation processes. 
Another note on this handbook is that it approach to assessing and defining risk 
is consistent with MIL-STD-882E [14]. It includes the same severity categories, 
probability levels, software control categories, and software criticality index [1]. 
Another aspect of this handbook that is consistent with MIL-STD-882E 
[14] is the use of LORs (levels of rigor). After the software criticality index (SCI) is 
defined, it is correlated to a LOR and each LOR has a defined set of 
requirements that are then applied to that system software. Defining specific 
requirements for the LORs is a project specific activity, but they typically cover 
the scope of design requirements, process tasks, and test tasks. Some examples 
of design requirements are fault tolerant design, fault detection, redundancy, 
independence, and full COTS features disclosure and analysis. Some examples 
of process tasks are design reviews, code walkthroughs, independent reviews, 
and specific software language requirements. Some examples of test tasks are 
safety-significant function testing, 100% regression testing, verification and 




This handbook describes the software safety task implementation steps 
that should be viewed as a baseline, understanding that there are specific cases 
that will require variations to this model. The defined steps are analyze 
conceptual design baseline, define software assurance LOR, functional hazard 
analysis, preliminary hazard analysis, safety requirements analysis, preliminary 
software design SSHA, detailed software design SSHA, and system hazard 
analysis [1]. 
The software design SSHA section of this handbook goes into some 
detailed descriptions of design and analysis techniques. While it does not identify 
any as requirements, it does provide useful information for assisting in identifying 
when certain techniques should be used and when they should not. Some of the 
techniques described are safety interlocks, come-from programming, control flow 
analysis, interrupt analysis, and formal proofs of correctness [1]. 
Appendix D of this handbook is specifically focused on use of commercial 
off the shelf (COTS) and non-developmental item (NDI) software. This appendix 
recognizes that, “The safety assessment of COTS and NDI software poses one 
of the greatest challenges to the safety assessment”. It also recognizes the 
advantages for utilizing this type of product as being, “cost savings (no 
development costs), rapid insertion of new technology, proven product/process, 
possible broad user base, potential technical support, and potential logistics 
support”. Unfortunately there are also significant disadvantages, as mentioned in 
chapter one of this thesis. Some of those are as follows: potential for limited 
development, test, or configuration control documentation, unknown 
development history, unavailability of design and test data, limited or no 
supportability from the developer or vendors, unavailability of safety analyses for 
the COTS application, or potential for increased test and analysis required for 
safety verification. The actual list of advantages and disadvantages may vary 
drastically from one specific situation to another but these are good points to 
consider when evaluating a decision to use this type of equipment [1]. 
The approach presented in this handbook for evaluating a COTS item for 
selection and use in a safety system is the confidence, influence, and complexity 
criteria. The confidence aspect is focused on achieving strong evidence that 
indicates the COTS item will successfully perform its critical functions when 
installed within the full range of possible operating environmental parameters. 
The influence aspect focuses on understanding the safety significance of the role 
of the COTS item within the host safety system. Finally, the complexity aspect 
focuses on a combination of safety factors, testability factors, and integration 
factors. With these three criteria (confidence, influence, and complexity) 
evaluations can be performed to make decisions about whether or not certain 
COTS items should be used within a particular safety system [1]. 
Appendix E of this handbook covers generic software safety requirements 
and guidelines. The high level topics covered include design and development 
process requirements and guidelines, system design requirements and 




environment requirements and guidelines, self-check design requirements and 
guidelines, safety-critical computing system functions protection requirements 
and guidelines, interface design requirements, human interface, critical timing 
and interrupt functions, software design and development requirements and 
guidelines, software maintenance requirements and guidelines, and software 
analysis and testing. While the information in this section is very detailed, it still 
allows for flexibility in the implementation of individual projects. This appendix 
can serve as a general checklist to assist in the completeness of the planning 
and executing of a specific project. 
General Observations 
The Department of Defense’s approach to safety systems is geared very 
much towards process and intentionally does not focus on requiring specific 
design criteria. This makes sense when considering the wide range of systems 
that the DOD utilizes. Focusing on requiring specific design principles may 
unnecessarily limit certain design activities. Instead, the focus is on the 
identification of the risks involved in each specific project and defining the 
appropriate levels of rigor to be implemented to eliminate or reduce those risks 
appropriately. For some industries this approach of addressing each project 
individually would not be viable but, because the DOD will most likely purchase 




CHAPTER FOUR  
COMPARE AND CONTRAST METHODOLOGIES 
Classification of Systems and Components  
The use of classification methodologies for safety systems is all about 
ensuring a consistent level of rigor is applied to situations/applications in order to 
mitigate specific levels of risk. So a comparison of classification methodologies 
across different industries is also a comparison of the level of rigor (LOR) applied 
to those systems and components [14]. The main advantage to understanding 
the classification methodologies and understanding how they are the same is so 
that equipment used in a certain class of applications in one industry could also 
be used in an equivalent class of application in a different industry. 
Overall, there is a theme through the various industries that the more 
important the system is to maintaining safety (often referred to as the safety 
significance) the higher the LOR is required to be. Underneath that theme there 
are factors such as likelihood of a hazardous event occurring and consequences 
of the hazardous event that are often considered to conclude how important a particular system is [12]. Within this overall theme the particular methodologies 
for determining which systems are most important to safety is where significant 
variability is observed. 
Probabilistic vs Deterministic 
Classification methodologies can be probabilistic, deterministic, or a 
combination of both. Probabilistic methodologies are those approaches that 
account for the expected likelihood of hazardous events occurring and their 
associated consequences, also described as risk. Deterministic approaches are 
those that don’t account for probabilistic factors. Instead, they classify equipment 
based on factors such as specific functions the equipment will perform, and 
severity of the consequences of the equipment’s failure [12]. Both deterministic 
and probabilistic methodologies can be described further as either being 
qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative approaches involve numerical values that 
can be calculated. A numerical indicator is calculated to represent key 
characteristics of the system being classified [36]. Qualitative approaches do not 
involve the use of any mathematical calculations and rely on factors that cannot 
be accounted for numerically [36]. 
All instances of the nuclear industry that were surveyed use a primarily 
deterministic and qualitative approach. The US nuclear industry (IEEE standards 
based) employs a simple two category strategy. Equipment is either Class 1E 
(safety) or Non-Class 1E (non-safety) and is put into these categories solely 
based on whether or not it is involved in a particular list of functions being 
performed in the plant [11]. The international nuclear industry uses a more 
expanded scheme but still deterministic and qualitative approach involving 




functions. The key that makes these approaches deterministic is that there is a 
set relationship between the plant functions and the classifications without 
accounting for variability related to probability of failure. Both the international 
and US industries acknowledge that there is value in using methodologies that 
incorporate accounting of risk but those are currently viewed as no more than 
supplemental to the main deterministic approaches. The international industry 
does include an explicit direction for the deterministic approach to be 
complimented by probabilistic approaches when it is considered appropriate [12]. 
Another note on the international nuclear industry is that it classifies functions 
separately from actual equipment [13]. Once the functions are categorized, the 
equipment is classified as 1, 2, or 3 based on what functions that equipment will 




 Figure 4.1. A Comparison of Different Classification Systems  
The columns of this figure qualitatively illustrate the relationships between the different 
nuclear classification schemes and is extracted from Table 1 of Ref [64] 
 
 The US Department of Defense’s approach to classifying equipment is 
considered probabilistic. Understanding and accounting for risk is a foundational 
aspect of the DOD’s methodology. Their methodologies can mostly be described 
as qualitative more than quantitative but both are used. Concerning hardware 
and non-computer based systems, risk is evaluated using two factors: severity 
and frequency. For computer-based systems, risk is evaluated differently. 
Instead of frequency, a set of software control categories (SCC) are used that 
describe software characteristics from a high perspective and are assigned levels 
based on those characteristics’ sensitivity to the prevention of hazards. To 
complete the evaluation of risk and the classification process, the SCC is then 
combined with the severity level of negligible, marginal, critical, or catastrophic. 
The combined result is the software criticality index and that is directly used to 




(calls for a low LOR) to 1 (calls for a very high LOR). Figure 4.2 illustrates this 
methodology. 
When classifying safety systems, process industries use a probabilistic 
approach that starts by evaluating the risks and the necessary risk reduction, this 
is similar to the methodology of the US DOD. Another similarity between the 
DOD and the process industry is that there are a vast array of applications that 
must be able to be covered by the standards and methodologies. Once the risk is 
understood, the necessary risk reduction factors are specified. These risk 
reduction factors can be non-safety instrumented system prevention/ mitigation 
protection layers, SIS, and/ or other protection layers. Focusing on the use of 
SIS, the process industry allows for all possible qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies for determining what the safety integrity level (SIL) of the SIS 
needs to be [10]. One of those methodologies is a hazardous event severity 
matrix that is very similar to what is used by the DOD. The process industry does 
not specify exactly what factor is used on the vertical axis so an example is 
shown in Figure 4.3 of the number of risk reduction approaches that are being 
implemented in parallel. This is in contrast to the use of software criticality 
categories in Figure 4.2. 
Level of Rigor 
The actual design criteria and techniques used during the design and 
manufacturing process establish the level of rigor. Another way to think about it is 
that it is the driver for the building of the required level of evidence that the 
equipment will perform its function at the required level of reliability and safety 
integrity. The classification process sets the goals and the level of rigor meets the 
goals and provides the evidence to prove it. 
One common perspective among the industries surveyed is that potential 
systematic faults (mainly from software-based systems) cannot be measured 
quantitatively the way potential random hardware failures of non-computer-based 
systems can. The involvement of software limits the effectiveness of the 
quantitative analysis techniques because software is not actually considered to 
ever fail. If the system is caused to behave in an undesirable manner because of 
the software, it is commonly viewed as a design fault. It is much more difficult to 
model errors in the software quantitatively the way a mechanical component can 
be predicted to fail through the use of a quantitative probabilistic model [1], [25], 
[32].  
This observation causes the translation of classifications to LOR to involve 
both quantitative and qualitative goals. This is best stated in Part 1 of IEC 61508: It is important to note that the failure measures for SILs1, 2, 3 and 4 
are target failure measures. It is accepted that only with respect to the 
hardware safety integrity (see 3.5.5 of IEC 61508-4) will it be possible to 
quantify and apply reliability prediction techniques in assessing whether 
the target failure measures have been met. Qualitative techniques and 




 Figure 4.2. Software Criticality Matrix  
This figure shows how the severity and software control categories are correlated to 
determine a software criticality index for the DOD (Table 4-2 of Ref [1])  
 
 Figure 4.3. Hazardous Event Severity Matrix  
This example figure shows how the number of safety related systems and the severity 
are correlated to identify the SIL that should be required within the IEC 61508 and ISA 




meet the target failure measures with respect to the systematic safety 
integrity (see 3.5.4 of IEC 61508-4) [32]. 
 As an example of this, each SIL is assigned a quantitative reliability goal (as 
shown in Figure 4.4) but is also given an extensive set of recommended and 
highly recommended design criteria in Parts 2 & 3 of IEC 61508 [15], [24] and 
Part 1 of ISA 84.00.01 [16]. 
A useful comparison of LOR is difficult partly because the DOD has set up 
their process to utilize a custom tailored LOR for each project that correlates the 
SCI to specific tasks through the different phases of the development process, as 
shown in Figure 4.5. Each DOD project could potentially have very different 
definitions of what is involved with the same category of a level of rigor. 
The level of rigor is defined in the international nuclear industry quite well 
through the IEC nuclear standards. The A, B, and C categories are threaded 
throughout the associated standards so that the efforts applied to hardware and 
software are laid out clearly for each of those categories. It is quite the opposite 
of the DOD’s custom tailored level of rigor framework. 
The US nuclear industry has a clearly defined level of rigor at the system 
level, but because the framework only contains two categories, the level of rigor 
at the individual component level is vague. A prime example of this is in 
commercial grade dedication of digital components. In the guidance and 
standards associated with this type of activity it is commonly stated that the level 
of rigor should be determined based on the “safety significance and complexity of 
the device” [28]. This is identified as a “Graded Approach” [2]. The problem with 
this guidance is that it is very open ended. There is no clear definition of the 
scales for safety significance and complexity, and there is also no clear 
translation of those factors into specific levels of effort. This industry recognizes 
this issue and continues to work towards resolving it. 
A detailed review and comparison of levels of rigor for each classification 
scheme would be necessary to positively correlate each of them to the IEC 
61508 SILs. This task is possible but would require a substantial amount of time 
and effort. For the purposes of this thesis, this correlation will not be made. 
Instead it will suffice to acknowledge that the correlation is possible to be made 
and to categorize that effort as potential future work. Because of the 
customization of LORs for the DOD, correlation in that scheme would simply be 
that IEC 61508 SILs would be integrated into custom sets of LORs. 
Defending Against Random Failures  
Hardware 
Random failures of individual hardware components are typically not 
attributed to design flaws but instead are the result of variations in the 
manufacturing process and the specific environmental stressor a component is 




 Figure 4.4. SILs 
Qualitative reliability goals specified within the IEC 61508 framework (Table 3 in Section 
7.6.2.9 of Ref [32])  
 
 Figure 4.5. Example Custom LOR Template  
This is an example of how levels of effort are customized within DOD projects to meet 




Efforts are certainly made to use the longest lasting and most reliable 
components, but at some point the focus must be put on designing systems so 
that they can handle these random hardware failures when they occur. The 
actual techniques implemented vary between the industries that have been 
surveyed. For additional background information on reliability see references 
[65], [66]. 
Both the US and international nuclear industries, through utilizing IEEE 
standards and IAEA safety guides, implement a defense in depth strategy that 
generally starts with a methodology called the single-failure criterion [11], [67]. 
The single-failure criterion is a deterministic approach to a hardware system 
reliability analysis. In this strategy, the system is designed in a manner that no 
single component failure can cause the system to fail from performing its safety 
function. This criterion covers the potential cascading failures and the failures 
resulting from design basis events, such as earthquakes. Particularly for 
computer based systems, this criterion includes the failure of a single control 
processor or a single software fault [17], [67].  
One critique of this methodology is that due to its deterministic nature and 
its system level focus, it is difficult to clearly identify what the reliability targets 
should be for individual components within the system. It is assumed that no 
more than one independent failure will occur within the system at a time, so 
probabilistic and quantitative methods can be implemented to help ensure this 
goal is achieved [23], [67]. While there appears to be a common intention among 
countries with nuclear power plants to increase the use of probabilistic and 
quantitative reliability goals [67], [68], the actual level of implementation is at 
varying degrees.  
In the nuclear industry, redundancy is the key technique used to defend 
against random failures. The use of redundancy is how the single failure criterion 
is complied with. The idea of redundancy is that additional replicated paths are 
available for the accomplishment of the safety function that the system is 
required to perform. The secondary factor that is considered in conjunction with 
redundancy is independence. Redundancy can only be effective if the replicated 
paths are sufficiently independent of each other.  
Redundancy and independence are intended to be applied into the overall 
design of the system but it is possible for them to be included internally to 
complex components. It is not commonly expected for that to be the case for off-
the-shelf equipment. A more common expectation for typical components is that 
they will be of high quality to allow for the achievement of a qualitatively high 
level of reliability. 
In contrast to the nuclear industry, both the DOD and the process industry 
mainly utilize probabilistic approaches to defend against random failures. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies are used but the risk or likelihood of a 
failure is consistently included [1], [14], [16]. Some of the techniques commonly 
used are reliability block diagrams, Markov modeling, fault tree analysis, and 




methods is used to model the system, commonly in a quantitative manner, to 
determine if the system will provide the required level of reliability. When 
performed quantitatively, a numerical value of reliability is assigned to the 
individual components so that they can be analyzed together to determine a 
numerical value for the overall system. These modelling approaches, even when 
performed qualitatively, tend to make it easier to derive reliability goals for 
individual components than it is when deterministic approaches, such as the 
single failure criterion, are used [69].  
Despite the differences in deterministic and probabilistic system reliability 
analysis techniques, the approach to defending against random failures is very 
similar to what is done in the nuclear industry. Redundant system architectures 
are once again the key. In the process industry the term often used is fault 
tolerance [16]. Redundancy is the primary methodology for designing fault 
tolerance into systems. A specific example of how redundancy can be built in to 
increase fault tolerance is in the use of voting schemes. Independent sections 
can be setup to be compared to determine the state of a process and to 
diagnose failures within the redundant sections. In these designs, the control 
logic is configured to take action based on the state of one or multiple input 
signals (the redundant signals are considered to be voting for a particular action 
to occur or not occur). One out of two (1oo2) and two out of three (2oo3) 
architectures are commonly used depending on if the goal is to achieve high 
reliability, or high availability, or both [69]. 
Software 
In general, random failures are not considered to be applicable to 
software. Software-related issues are typically characterized as systematic 
failures, and therefore, are not generally analyzed within reliability assessments. 
Within the industries surveyed there were no measures identified to defend 
against random failures of software. There is no common implementation of 
concepts such as hardware redundancy when it comes to software. There is a 
similar concept called diversity [11], [67] that is commonly used but from a 
rigorous perspective, diversity is an approach to prevent systematic faults. 
Therefore, it will not be discussed here, but instead, will be found in the next 
section.  
Preventing Systematic Faults 
Beyond the random hardware failures, the other issue that must be 
addressed is systematic faults. These are design errors that were not observed 
and corrected during the development process. In order to prevent these kinds of 
faults from being allowed to exist within the design of a component or system, 




Lifecycle Processes and Designing Techniques 
The main frame work that is applied to prevent systematic faults is the lifecycle 
methodology and the designing techniques that are interwoven into the phases of 
the lifecycle. The use of a lifecycle methodology is a common practice between 
all of the industries surveyed. Within the IEC 61508 standards, implemented 
within the process industry, and utilized in the international nuclear industry, is an 
overall safety system lifecycle, as shown in Figure 4.6. This structure is broken 
down into more detail for the system hardware and software realization phase as 
shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. Then Figure 4.9 shows a design process 
lifecycle approach from IEEE 1012 (Standard for System and Software 
Verification and Validation) which is a commonly used standard in the US nuclear 
industry. Common among the life cycle models for the realization of equipment is 
that they will start with a phase that captures the requirements that will become 
the goals for the design to achieve. Then there is generally a phase were the 
requirements are translated into a plan for the hardware and software design. 
Next there is typically a phase for implementing the design plan by building the 
hardware, writing the software code, and then integrating the hardware and 
software together. Finally, a validation phase is generally utilized to take 
measures to prove that the requirements established at the beginning of the 
process have been met. The different models contain these phases, as a 
minimum, and will vary in what other phases are also included, such as periodic 
hazard analysis. The models also vary in how the process is expected to move 
between the different phases. Some examples of this potential difference can be 
seen from DOD standards and are shown in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11. The 
reason that lifecycles have been broadly implemented across these different 
industries is that it is a common perspective that they facilitate a very methodical 
process which causes the design team to focus on making sure that they fully 
accomplished what they set out to do. 
Built-in Safety Features 
There are many features that can be included within the design of a 
component to increase its ability to operate safely and reliably. Many of these 
types of design features fall into the category of being self-diagnostics. Self-
diagnostics and fault detection are features that are included within the design 
that provide immediate identification of when there is a problem. It was observed 
universally through all the industries surveyed that these types of features were 
desirable to be included. One specific example for why this is important is the 
topic of fault detection [17]. One of the worst scenarios for a safety system is that 
it is in a failed state and there is no indication of a problem until the system is 
called upon to perform its safety function.  
Throughout the industries surveyed, specific techniques for self-
diagnostics and fault detection are typically not specified, but instead, the 
requirements specify that these types of features shall be included. In this 




  Figure 4.6. Overall Safety Lifecycle  
This figure presents the full lifecycle covered by the IEC 61508 framework. This is at the 
plant level and is filtered down into individual lifecycles of specific safety systems and 
equipment (Figure 2 of Ref [32]) 




 Figure 4.7. Safety Lifecycle- Equipment Realization Phase  
This is the section of the IEC 61508 lifecycle that applies to the realization of individual 
systems and/or components (Figure 3 of Ref [32])  
 
 Figure 4.8. Safety Lifecycle- Software Realization Phase  
This is the section of the IEC 61508 lifecycle that applies to the realization of the software 




  Figure 4.9. Relationship of system, software, and hardware processes  
This illustrates development process within the IEEE structure and shows the relationship 
between the overall design process, the hardware design process, and the software 






 Figure 4.10. V Model  
This illustrates the V model of verification and validation used in DOD projects. It is 
commonly used outside the realm of DOD projects as well (Figure 2-6 of Ref [1])  
 
 Figure 4.11. Grand Design Waterfall Model  
This illustrates the Waterfall model of verification and validation used in DOD projects. It 




material to aid the designers in choosing the features that integrate the best into 
their overall design [1], [38]. In other contexts specific percentages of coverage 
are specified to drive the reduction of the probability of the existence of an 
undiscovered failure [15]. 
Design Analysis and Verification & Validation 
Within the lifecycle processes, there are a variety of techniques that may 
be used to perform design analyses and to perform verification and validation 
testing that may pertain to hardware, software, or both. These aspects are 
considered vital to the development of safety systems and components in order 
to ensure the design meets all the specified requirement. These topics are 
consistently addressed at a high level within the standards of the industries 
surveyed. The specific techniques to be utilized are generally left open to be 
determined by the designers/ engineers of the equipment, but some are identified 
as recommended or highly recommended for particular levels of rigor (also 
known as integrity levels). 
Parts 2, 3, and 7 of the IEC 61508 standard for functional safety [15], [24], 
[38] contain comprehensive appendices that identify a wide range of these 
analysis and testing techniques. The techniques are provided in a tabular format 
which includes insight into how the classification of the equipment and the 
corresponding level of rigor (a.k.a. integrity level) are factored in. Figure 4.12 and 
Figure 4.13 are examples of these types of tables taken directly from these 
standards. These appendices are potentially very useful for interfacing between 
industries and equipment manufacturers to ensure expectations of the rigor to be 
applied in the prevention of systematic faults is clearly understood by both parties 
involved. 
The document that best addresses this topic area in the US Nuclear 
industry is IEEE 1012 [70]. This standard addresses testing of individual 
components, at the integration phase, at the qualification phase, and at the 
acceptance phase. Some of the types of design analyses discussed are 
algorithm analysis, control flow analysis, data flow analysis, simulation analysis, 
and code sizing and timing analysis. 
For the US DOD, the Joint Software System Safety Engineering 
Handbook [1] identifies many potential techniques that could be used for analysis 
and testing. A sample of what is include is data flow analysis control flow 
analysis, “What If” analysis, interface analysis, safety-critical path analysis, 
thread analysis, interrupt analysis, requirements-based testing, path coverage 
testing, stress testing, endurance testing, and fault insertion and failure mode 
testing. 
Hazard Analysis 
Another methodology that is used to prevent systematic faults is the 
hazard analysis. A hazard analysis is defined as “A process that explores and 




  Figure 4.12. Example from Appendix B of Ref [15] 
This is an example of the content of Appendices A, B, and C of Part 2 of IEC61508 and 
shows how SILs are easily and clearly translated into specific levels of effort in the design 
process  
 
  Figure 4.13. Example from Appendix A of Ref [24] 
This is an example of the content of Appendices A, B, and C of Part 3 of IEC61508 and 
shows how SILs are easily and clearly translated into specific levels of effort in the 




testing process. The scope of hazard analysis extends beyond plant design basis 
events by including abnormal events and plant operations with degraded 
equipment and plant systems. Hazard analysis focuses on system failure 
mechanisms rather than verifying correct system operation” [71]. There are 
several ways to perform a hazard analysis and there are several different points 
in projects when they can be utilized.  
The US DOD implements hazard analyses at many points in their projects. 
They perform a preliminary hazard analysis, a system requirements hazard 
analysis, a subsystem hazard analysis, a system hazard analysis, an operating 
and support hazard analysis, a health hazard analysis, a functional hazard 
analysis, a system-of-systems hazard analysis, and finally an environmental 
hazard analysis [14]. They utilize all of these iterations of analysis to continuously 
evaluate risk of systematic faults and make as much effort as is appropriate to 
reduce or eliminate that risk. 
The process industry uses what they call a failure analysis but it is 
essentially the same thing as a hazard analysis and is used in the same way as 
how hazard analysis has already been defined. The types of failure analysis 
identified in the IEC standards typically used by the process industry are the 
failure modes and effects analysis, cause consequence diagrams, event tree 
analysis, failure modes, effects and criticality analysis, fault tree analysis, worst-
case analysis, expanded functional testing, worst-case testing, and fault insertion 
testing. Many of these types are found in the other industries surveyed as well, 
possibly identified as failure analysis or hazard analysis techniques. 
The US nuclear industry identifies the following guidelines for the 
implementation of hazard analysis: avoidance of hazards identification and 
evaluation of hazards, identification of hazards throughout the system life cycle, 
resolution of hazards, evaluation of hazards in previously developed systems, 
and documentation of hazard analysis plans, responsibilities, and results [17]. 
Common Cause Failure Prevention 
Despite the rigorous effort put into ensuring that no systematic faults exist 
within safety systems, preventative measures are also implemented for dealing 
with the design errors that may potentially be introduced. One of the types of 
systematic faults that get a lot of attention in the process and nuclear industries is 
common cause failure. Simply put, common cause failures are design flaws that 
can cause multiple redundant sections of a safety system to all fail at the same 
time. This type of failure is of concern because by itself it can defeat several 
layers of defense against failure with one event. An example is a vulnerability to 
radiated electromagnetic interference. If an identical component is used in every 
redundant path of the safety system and then they all fail due to a technician 
using a radio for communication in their vicinity the overall system just failed due 
to one cause [69]. 
To prevent potentially unidentified common cause failures from defeating 




sections of the system. Diversity is defined as, “the principle of monitoring 
different parameters, using different technologies, different logic or algorithms, or 
different means of actuation in order to provide several ways of detecting and 
responding to a significant event” [67]. This means that redundant sections of the 
system will utilized entirely different technologies, they may monitor entirely 
different parameters of the process, and they may actuate safety functions in 
entirely different ways. Independence is the principle of the redundant and 
diverse sections of the system functioning separate from each other in as many 
ways as possible. For example, the different sections of the system should not 
both be dependent on the same power source. “Independence prevents: (1) 
propagation of failures from system to system or (2) propagation of failures 
between redundant parts within systems, and (3) common cause failures due to 
common internal plant hazards” [67]. 
The process industry also considers common cause issues. The guidance 
in that industry for avoiding common cause failures is 3 principles. Principle 1 is 
to reduce common stress, principle 2 is to apply diversity, and principle 3 is to 
ruggedize the design for high strength [69]. 
Within the US nuclear industry, it is understood that systems need to be 
designed to be protected from unidentified common cause failures. A specific 
analysis technique has been developed and put into practice for the purpose of 
identifying those potential failures. This analysis is called diversity and defense-
in-depth and is often abbreviated as D3. What D3 is intended to do is to identify if 
a safety system has enough diversity or not. Diversity can be implemented to 
varying degrees and in various ways. To promote consistency, standards such 
as IEEE 7-4.3.2 include requirements for the level of diversity that must exist and 
research has been performed to better identify the different approaches that can 
be utilized. The NRC published that research in NRC CR-7007 “Diversity 
Strategies” and this document identifies 3 separate strategies that can be 
utilized. Those strategies are defined as: Strategy A- focuses on the use of fundamentally diverse 
technologies as the basis for diverse systems, redundancies, or 
subsystems. The Strategy A baseline, at the system or platform level, is 
illustrated by the example of analog and digital implementations providing 
design diversity. This choice of technology inherently contributes notable 
equipment manufacturer, processing equipment, functional, life-cycle, and 
logic diversities. Intentional application of life-cycle and equipment 
manufacturer diversities is included in the baseline, while the traditional 
use of functional and signal diversities is also adopted. The use of a 
microprocessor-based primary protection system and an analog 
secondary protection system at the Sizewell NPP represents the principal 
example of Strategy A drawn from the survey findings. 
Strategy B- involves the use of distinctly different technology 
approaches as the basis for diverse systems, redundancies, or 




different digital technologies, such as the distinct approaches represented 
by programmable logic devices and general-purpose microprocessors. 
This choice of technology inherently contributes some measure of 
equipment manufacturer, processing equipment, functional, life-cycle, and 
logic diversities. Intentional application of logic processing equipment, life-
cycle, and equipment manufacturer diversities is included in the baseline, 
while the traditional use of functional and signal diversities is also adopted. 
The Olkiluoto diversity approach using different digital technologies (i.e., 
CPUs vs FPGAs) as the basis for the primary safety system and a diverse 
backup system is the principal example of Strategy B drawn from the 
survey findings. Nonnuclear industry examples from the rail industry 
employed this technology difference to implement significantly different 
functional approaches in a parallel arrangement of safety-critical and 
checking systems. 
Strategy C represents the use of architectural variations within a 
technology as the basis for diverse systems, redundancies, or 
subsystems. An example of the Strategy C baseline involves different 
digital architectures, such as the diverse microarchitectures provided by 
different CPUs. This choice of technology inherently contributes some 
limited degree of equipment manufacturer, life-cycle, and logic diversities. 
Intentional application of equipment manufacturer, logic processing 
equipment, life- cycle, and logic diversities is included in the baseline, 
while the traditional use of functional and signal diversities is also adopted. 
The use of diverse microprocessors as the basis for primary safety 
systems and diverse backup systems such as (ATWS) or (DAS) 
constitutes the principal examples of Strategy C drawn from the survey 
findings. Nonnuclear industry examples primarily involve flight control 
systems for the aviation industry. [72] 
Environmental Qualification 
Environmental testing is used in the nuclear industries to detect potential 
systematic faults and common cause failures by exposing the equipment to worst 
case conditions for what they could see while in service. During this testing, the 
equipment is verified to successfully perform their safety function before, during, 
and after exposure to the anticipated conditions [43], [55]. This testing is typically 
extended out to all credible design basis events for the reactor site and often 
involves seismic testing, radiation exposure, aging analysis, and extreme 
electromagnetic compatibility testing. This technical aspect appears to be one 
significant difference between the nuclear industry and the process industry in 
that the process industry does not typically require the same kinds of 
environmental qualification and does not invoke the same level of rigor. As a 
result, the typical safety certified off-the-shelf equipment utilized by the process 





Suitability Evaluation of “Off-the-Shelf” Equipment 
In any industry, once an I&C safety system has been conceptually 
specified and designed the inevitable next question is, will new equipment need 
to be created or is there equipment already in existence that could be utilized? 
There can be several factors that go into answering this question. Factors such 
as how close does existing equipment come to meeting the conceptual 
requirements, what is the cost difference between using something existing 
versus creating something new, will this be a one of a kind system or will several 
copies be needed, can new equipment be as dependable as existing mature 
products. These factors can play out very differently in each industry and in the 
variety of applications, but inevitably the need arises to evaluate existing 
equipment (often called off-the-shelf equipment) for use in safety systems. 
There are several common threads between the each industry’s 
processes of evaluating the suitability of off-the-shelf equipment. All of the 
industries surveyed would focus on determining the functional suitability of the 
potential equipment (does it adequately perform the functions that are required), 
and then a deeper look is taken at the design processes that were used to be 
able to prove that the item has sufficient design integrity to prove the required 
reliability and assurance that there is built in quality to prevent systematic faults. 
It is also common to review operating history of potential products to mitigate 
deficiencies in design documentation. This is sometimes referred to as the prior 
use basis, and is simply making the claim that since the component operated 
successfully in the past in applications that are similar to the proposed 
application, there is reasonable assurance that it will also operate successfully in 
that proposed application [1], [15], [28]–[30]. 
An aspect of all suitability evaluations is that they consist of two parts. The 
first part is an analysis of the intended application. The second aspect is the 
analysis of the potential equipment. This seems to be common sense as it is 
necessary to understand both aspect to be able to make a credible 
determination. For the purposes of this thesis, the application specific aspects 
will be omitted since every application is different and the intent of the safety 
certification process is to provide a generic assessment that can be utilized for 
many applications. 
There are two documents that service as good examples of these 
concepts and commonalities. The first is IEC 62671, [30] from the international 
nuclear industry and is focused on equipment of limited functionality. The second 
is EPRI 1011710, [29] from the US nuclear industry, and is typically applied to 
complex equipment.  
A summary of the topics addressed in IEC 62671 is Competence of 
Primary Function, Ancillary Functions, Configurability, Superfluous Functions, 
Hardware Robustness, Reliability, Maintainability, and Testability, Cybersecurity, 
User Documentation for Safety, Previous Certification, Avoidance of Systematic 
Faults, Evidence of Quality in the Design Process, Evidence of Quality in 




and/or Analysis, and Documentation Improvement. A summary of the EPRI 
1011710 format is a Functional Review, an Architecture Review, a Process 
Review, a System Failure Analysis, and an Operating History Survey. 
Synthesis of Observations 
As a result of this comparing and contrasting activity, the point can be 
made that, at the system level, there are significant and possibly irreconcilable 
differences between the surveyed industries. Particularly because of the topics of 
hardware reliability and common cause failure prevention, it may be too large of 
a task to attempt to repurpose an entire system from an application in one of 
these industries for use in another. But, in contrast, a case can be made that 
many of these significant differences fade away as the perspective is lowered 
from the system level to the individual component level. The term component is 
used to refer to a typical piece of industrial equipment, such as a sensing 
element, a logic solver, or a control element. 
Classification scheme differences at the system level could be highly 
impactful to the compatibility of that system to another industry. Classification is a 
foundational aspect that drives the level of rigor of all the activities that go into 
developing and implementing the system. Variability at that level will have 
significant rippling effects between all the interfaces involved. At the component 
level the impact of classification differences and the resulting variability of level of 
rigor can be better understood and evaluated since the scope of the design 
under consideration is much simpler. 
Within the realm of the defense against random hardware failures, the 
system level concept of single failure criterion is difficult to correlate with 
probability based reliability methodologies. But at the component level of the 
single failure criterion methodology, the requirements are very loose and easily 
compatible with other quantitative probabilistic reliability methodologies. Since 
the goal of the single failure criterion is to ensure that no one failure can prevent 
the system from performing its safety function, the reliability requirements of the 
individual components boils down to each one being reliable enough to provide 
reasonable assurance that when one failure occurs that there is sufficient time for 
that failure to be repaired before the next failure happens. This scenario could 
easily be translated into a standard quantitative value to be applied to each 
individual component. 
The use of lifecycle processes was a topic where no major differences 
were observed and these processes are generally very scalable between the 
system and component levels. The lifecycle of the overall system typically wraps 
around and encompasses the lifecycle processes of the individual components. 
The topics of built-in safety features, design analysis, verification, and 
validation, and hazard analysis are similar to the topic of lifecycle processes, in 
regards to their impact to the system and component levels. None of these 
present significant negative impact to efforts to utilize the same systems or 




Common cause failure prevention is very application specific and the level 
of rigor that was observed being applied to this activity did vary significantly 
between the different industries. This topic focuses on redundancy, 
independence, and diversity at the system level and the nuclear industry seems 
to have focused in on it more than the US DOD or the processes industries. 
There are many different possible approaches to this type of prevention as 
previously discussed, but similarly to what was observed regarding other cases 
of significant system level differences, when the perspective is lowered down to 
the component level the significance of those differences fade away. At the 
component level, the only considerations of this topic are documentation of the 
design architecture and processes to ensure the necessary information is 
available when the common cause failure prevention activities occur at the 
system level. Other than that there is little to be concerned with when evaluating 
an individual component. 
It is ideal to evaluate environmental qualification at the system level but it 
is reasonable to conclude that a system assembled with individual components 
that are qualified for the specified environment will also be able to be qualified for 
that same environment. Dealing with this topic at the individual component level 
may result in some level of over qualification because of testing being performed 
without components installed within cabinets and a lack of ability to evaluate 
anomalous behavior within the context of the system, but as long as it is 
economically feasible to accomplish, it would not be an issue that would prevent 
the exchangeability of equipment from one industry to another. The current 
reality of this subject is that components are typically qualified to environmental 
parameters that are normal for most process industries and do not encompass 
the extremes that are sometimes experienced in the nuclear industry or in DOD 
applications, making this topic the most significant negative impact to be able to 
use the same components universally between different industries. 
Within suitability evaluations of “off-the-shelf” equipment, no significant 
differences were observed so no significant negative impact to efforts to utilize 
the same systems or components in various industries were perceived. In 
practice, this is a topic that mainly applies to individual components, but 
technically it could be used for systems so it was additionally observed that the 
suitability evaluation processes would be applied similarly at both the system and 
component levels. 
As a result of these observations, it is clear that the greatest potential for a 
standardization of functional safety requirements and assessments between the 
various industries and equipment manufacturers is at the component level and 
not at the system level. The observations have been summarized in those 
components being suitable for use within many different systems and 
applications. The components can be common to the various industries, and the 
specific requirements of the different industries can be met as the components 






Table 4.1. The indication of “Low” in the last column of that table supports 
the determination of the standardization of functional safety being implemented 
at the component level. It can be concluded that most of the significant 
differences between the industries’ equipment requirements fades away down at 
the individual component level. This means that there is potential for 
manufacturers to focus on those components being suitable for use within many 
different systems and applications. The components can be common to the 
various industries, and the specific requirements of the different industries can be 
met as the components are integrated together into the complete system. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Comparison of System and Component Levels 
This table summarizes the significance of the observed differences regarding the 
specified topics at both the system and individual component levels. The indication of 
“Low” in the last column supports the determination of the standardization of functional 
safety being implemented at the component level. 
Category 
Significance of 
Differences at the 
System Level 
Significance of 
Differences at the 
Component Level 







Defense against Random Hardware 
Failures 
High Low 
Preventing Systematic Faults  Lifecycle Processes  Built-in Design Safety Features  Design Analysis, Verification, and Validation   Hazard Analysis  Common Cause Failure 






























CHAPTER FIVE  
STANDARDIZATION OF COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL SAFETY 
As concluded in the previous chapter, there is significant potential for 
standardization of functional safety requirements and assessments between 
various industries and equipment manufacturers at the component level. The 
vehicle proposed for use in this manner is the IEC 61508 set of standards 
accompanied by an independent certification process. Using the criteria and topic 
areas identified in the previous chapter, some actual “off-the-shelf” components 
will be evaluated to demonstrate how manufacturers have produced equipment 
that can be suitable for various safety significant applications in various industries 
by voluntarily seeking compliance with IEC 61508. To that end, the categories 
identified in the previous chapter will be used as criteria for evaluation of 
components. Showing that components adequately comply with these criteria will 
demonstrate their ability to be used in multiple industries, based on the 
discussions in the previous chapter. 
Additionally, these evaluations will seek to show how industries can avoid 
significant risk and remove uncertainty when embarking on a suitability 
evaluation of “off-the-shelf” equipment by intentionally engaging with 
manufacturers who have voluntarily sought and achieved third party certification 
to IEC 61508 to SIL 2 or higher. SIL 1 is excluded because at that level, some 
uncertainty about the design and manufacturing processes remains due to the 
greater potential for the “proven in use” basis to be utilized. To achieve SIL 2 or 
higher it can be more reasonably assumed that the original development 
activities included intentional efforts to seek compliance with IEC 61508. 
It is to these two ends that the following evaluations are being conducted, 
to show the practicalities of IEC 61508 as the vehicle for driving standardization, 
and also to show the higher level of confidence that can be reasonably assumed 
when making the initial decision to evaluate such equipment for suitability. 
Please note that all information used in these evaluations was available to 
the general public from either the manufacturer’s website or from the Safety 
Automation Equipment List website [39]. The first evaluation has been 
summarized in Table 5.1 and the second is in Table 5.2. Also note that the 
equipment shown in these examples are primarily used in the process industry 
but as a result of the proposed standardization, they could be used in the nuclear 
industry or potentially others as well. 
Moore Industries STZ Transmitter 
 
The first criterion is classification scheme and as previously discussed, 
classification is an industry specific activity to link risk to level of rigor related to 
providing and proving design integrity of a component or system. The SILs are 




Table 5.1. Evaluation of MII STZ Transmitter 
This table summarizes the evaluation of the STZ Transmitter’s design and associated design activities in the context of the criteria 
identified earlier in this thesis. 




















 Functional Safety Management (FSM) Plan  Safety Requirement Specification (includes 








 Self-diagnostics  Fault detection  Configurable safe failed state 










Table 5.1. Evaluation of MII STZ Transmitter (Continued) 






 Hardware Verification for correctness & consistency  Fault Injection, Module, and Integration Testing  Static Analysis for compliance with coding standard  100% test coverage of all functions, statements, and 













The details of the design are well documented and 








CE Mark, FM Approval 
Environmental qualification 
Operating Range: -40°C to +85°C (-40°F to +185°F) 
Storage Range: -40°C to +85°C (-40°F to +185°F) 
Relative Humidity: 0-95%, non-condensing 
94/9/EC (ATEX) Explosive Atmospheres 
EMC qualification 












As a new product, successful operating experience will 
obviously be lacking but this can be mitigated by the 
extensive attention that has been paid to preventing 








Table 5.2. Evaluation of Fisher Controls DVC6200 Valve Controller 












De-energize To Trip with Partial Valve Stroke Test  582 Safe Detected FITs  279 Safe Undetected FITs  79 Dangerous Detected FITs  41 Dangerous Undetected FITs 



























Table 5.2 Evaluation of Fisher Controls DVC6200 Valve Controller (Continued) 



















The details of the design are well documented and 








CSA, FM, ATEX, IECEx, CUTR, INMETRO, PESO 
CCOE 
Electromagnetic Compatibility 










There is indication that proven-in-use data is available 
for this item and it is not brand new so it is reasonable to 
expect significant and positive operating history data to 










link to each industry’s particular scheme. Future work is needed to map out the 
different classification schemes to specific SILs, but once that is done, the 
translation between classification and required SIL should be quite smooth. In 
this case, the exida certificate [73] indicates the Moore Industries Inc. (MII) STZ 
Dual Sensor Transmitter is SIL 3 capable. This means that industry specific 
applications would be able to easily determine if this item can be expected to be 
suitable based on what SIL level had been determined to be required. 
The second criterion is defense against random failure. In the context of a 
single component it is expected that a quantitative goal will be required that will 
lead to the necessary reliability of the overall system. For this item, the overall 
failure rate was calculated in FITs (1 failure/ 1 billion hours), and the results were 
171 Safe FITs, 166 Dangerous Detected FITs, and 85 Dangerous Undetected 
FITs [73] . These values could then be fed into the system level reliability 
analysis (deterministic or probabilistic) to ensure adequate reliability was going to 
be achieved. 
The third criterion is lifecycle processes and designing techniques, which 
is a subtopic of preventing systematic faults. MII was found to have planned and 
implemented a safety life cycle that was in compliance with the requirements of 
IEC 61508 for a SIL 3 certification. The lifecycle activities were guided by a 
functional safety management plan. The Software Development Procedure 
identified the phases of the software development lifecycle and the inputs and 
outputs associated with each phase. The software design activities included the 
use of data flow diagrams, structure diagrams, and sequence diagrams. The 
documentation of the lifecycle and designing techniques provides clear 
understanding of what has occurred at the component level and also provides a 
clear transition of information and processes up to the system level. 
The fourth criterion is another subtopic of preventing systematic faults. It is 
built-in safety features. The STZ transmitter has extensive self-diagnostics and 
fault detection features that were verified to have good coverage during the 
failure mode effect and diagnostics analysis (FMEDA). The software includes the 
ability to detect faults in the software control flow as well as in the data flow. Also 
the state in which the transmitter safely fails to is configurable to meet the needs 
of any specific application. This level of attention to developing a safe design at 
the component level will have a positive impact on efforts to design the overall 
system to function safely.  
The fifth criterion is design analysis, verification, and validation, yet 
another subtopic of preventing systematic faults. The hardware of the STZ 
Transmitter has been verified to meet safety functions and safety integrity 
requirements. That verification has been demonstrated through testing and 
evaluation of the hardware phase outputs for correctness and consistency. The 
types of verification and validation that were used was fault injection testing, 
module testing, and integration testing. Testing was performed statically and 
dynamically. A static code analysis was performed on the source code to ensure 




used to ensure that one or more test cases or analyses were used for validating 
each safety requirement.  
This criterion is at the heart of what separates IEC 61508 certified 
components from the average commercial component. The design analysis and 
verification & validation activities that have been found to have occurred for this 
component are very important and helpful in establishing the safety integrity of 
the overall system. Formal activities of this type cannot be expected to exist for 
any typical commercial component. 
The sixth criterion is hazard analysis, another subtopic of preventing 
systematic faults. A FMEDA was performed on this component during the 
development activities. This technique is an extension of the traditional failure 
mode and effect analysis (FMEA) in that it identifies online diagnostics 
techniques in the context of each failure mode analyzed. The conclusions of the 
FMEDA were verified using fault injection testing. The results of this analysis 
were used to reinforce weak aspects of the original design, and were also used 
to aid in the calculation of the various types of failure rates.  
This criterion is another that represents a clear difference between IEC 
61508 certified components and typical commercial components. There are 
certainly many other hazard analysis techniques that could be utilized but what 
has been done already is a very good start towards supporting the safe operation 
of the overall system. 
The seventh criterion is common cause failure prevention, another 
subtopic of preventing systematic faults. The scope of this criterion is very limited 
at the component level and is simply focused on the documentation and 
availability of the design details of the component. Those details have been well 
documented and would be available as inputs to a system level assessment. 
The eighth criterion is environmental qualification, the final subtopic of 
preventing systematic faults. The STZ Transmitter carries the CE Mark and FM 
Approval. From those certifications and from the operating parameters provided 
in the User’s Manual, conclusions can be drawn about the component being 
adequate to perform normally in various environments, including explosive 
environments. The difficult aspect of this criterion is that environmental 
parameters can be very extreme in some applications, making it difficult to 
encompass all applications with these generic qualifications. While this 
component’s level of qualification may be adequate for many environments, it 
can be expected that there will be some that are outside the bounds of how it 
was designed. The most obvious example is harsh nuclear radiation 
environments. Digital electronics are typically more susceptible to degradation 
from nuclear radiation than typical mechanical and analog components, so 
additional effort could be expected to make the component suitable for these 
types of environments. 
The ninth and final criterion is suitability evaluation of “off-the-shelf” 
equipment. Successful operating experience is typically an important aspect of 




since the product is new to the market. This should be able to be worked around 
though, due to the extensive attention that has been paid to preventing 
systematic failures and extending the predicted FIT rate. Also, because of the 
third party certification activities performed, in this case, by exida it is positive that 
this manufacturer is experienced with audits of their design and associated 
processes. It can be expected that the manufacturer will be open to additional 
industry specific audits and/or surveys. 
 Fisher Controls DVC6200 SIS Digital Valve Controller 
The first criterion is classification scheme. In this case, the exida 
certificate[76] indicated that the Fisher Controls Digital Valve Controller is SIL 3 
capable. Just like with the previous evaluation, once a clear link is determined 
between the industry classification scheme and the SILs, the translation will be 
quite smooth, and industries will be able to easily determine which components 
will have the adequate level of rigor required for their specific applications. 
The second criterion is defense against random hardware failures. The 
failure rates of this item were also calculated in FITs. Since this item can be 
configured in multiple ways that significantly impact the probability of failure, 
failure rates for each configuration are provided on the exida certificate. Some of 
those rates have been included in Table 5.2, and, just like in the first evaluation, 
these values could then be fed into the system level reliability analysis 
(deterministic or probabilistic) to ensure adequate reliability is going to be 
achieved. 
The third criterion is lifecycle processes and designing techniques. The 
exida assessment report confirms that the lifecycle activities were audited and 
found to be in compliance with the applicable requirements of IEC 61508. A 
functional safety management (FSM) plan was used to direct the activities, and 
Table 5.2 includes a list of the tasks and documents that were included. The 
activities and documentation identified are very sufficient to support the overall 
system lifecycle activities. 
The fourth criterion is built-in safety features. Within the design of the 
DVC6200 valve controller is included fault detection, backward recovery, a time 
triggered architecture, and static resource allocation. The fault detection 
coverage was evaluated to be sufficient during the FMEDA. Similar to the first 
evaluation, this level of attention to developing a safe design at the component 
level will have a positive impact on efforts to design the overall system to function 
safely. 
The fifth criterion is design analysis, verification, and validation. Table 5.2 
includes the specifics of what techniques were utilized from this category of 
activities. The exida assessment report indicated that there was intentionality in 
picking specific activities from Appendix B of IEC 61508 Part 2 [15] in order to 
meet the SIL 3 level of rigor. This is a good example of how this document is 
used successfully implement standardization between the industries and the 




level of rigor in their efforts to develop components that can successfully achieve 
certification, which then allows for better design integrity to be achieved at the 
system level. 
The sixth criterion is hazard analysis. Just like for the first component that 
was evaluated, a FMEDA was performed to ensure the design was reliable and 
that fault detection coverage was sufficient. Observing that this same type of 
activity was involved in both components being evaluated is a positive indicator 
of the consistent level of rigor that is driven through the use of the IEC 61508 
standard. In the typical commercial world, Hazard analysis are generally 
considered as luxuries and not absolute necessities because they require 
additional time and money and the components can possibly function properly 
without them. The use of the IEC 61508 standard pushes these luxuries into 
standard practice, which is a significant advantage for the high risk industries we 
are focused on throughout this thesis. 
The seventh criterion is common cause failure prevention. This section of 
this evaluation is very similar to the first evaluation. The design details have been 
well documented and would be available as inputs to a system level assessment. 
The eighth criterion is environmental qualification. This section is also very 
similar to the first evaluation. This component has many of the same 
environmental qualifications as the component in the first evaluation, which is 
good, but the potential for some applications requiring additional effort to 
evaluate remains. 
The ninth criterion is suitability evaluation of “off-the-shelf” equipment. 
Unlike the component in the first evaluation, this one does have evidence of a 
successful operating history. Additionally, it also has the positive aspects of 
documented evidence of attention to the prevention of systematic faults. This 
manufacturer also shares the positive aspect of being open to and experienced 
with audits. These factors make this component a good candidate to be put 
through this type of suitability evaluation. 
The previous two evaluations both support the use of IEC 61508 as a 
vehicle of standardization by demonstrating that the designs and associated 
processes of these two different manufacturers are held up to a consistent and 
desirable level of rigor at the component level. The resulting groundwork is then 
in place to support a very successful set of activities at the system level. 
 Additional Notes in Support of Standardization 
The awareness of wild variation in the design practices and 
documentation practices of equipment manufacturers [1], [28] causes there to be 
a significant level of uncertainty at the beginning of suitability evaluation efforts. 
The use of IEC 61508 and the third party certifiers removes substantial amounts 
of that uncertainty.  
While the US Nuclear industry is not currently taking advantage of IEC 
61508 the way the process industry is, there are examples of other international 




developed a software based tool for extracting critical information from 
equipment manufacturers in a manner that facilitates efficient and effective 
evaluations and that tool (called EMPHASIS) is built on many of the requirements 
of the IEC 61508 standard [79]. This example indicates that there is also 
potential for the US Nuclear industry to implement and benefit from this 
methodology for removing uncertainty, improving efficiency, and increasing 






CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION 
Comparison of Industries 
For the purpose of comparing different industries that involve the 
mitigation of significant risk through the implementation of instrumentation and 
controls equipment, the four identified categories (classification, defending 
against random failures, preventing systematic faults, and suitability evaluations) 
provide insight into understanding where the similarities and differences are 
related to the implementation of off the shelf equipment. 
Regarding the topic of classification, similarities were observed in the 
general intent of scaling the level of rigor to the safety significance of the 
equipment. Each industry had their own variations for categorizing the 
importance of the equipment in terms of the risks intended to be mitigated, but 
they all could potentially utilize the IEC 61508 SILs for standardization with 
manufacturers at the component level.  
Some differences were perceived within the topic of defending against random failures, but while the reliability concepts (deterministic versus 
probabilistic) appeared to be incompatible at the overall system level, there is still 
potential for coherence at the lower component level. Underneath the system 
level deterministic single failure criterion and the probabilistic modeling approach, 
there is potential for the utilization of the reliability targets that are inherent to the 
SILs. Additionally, despite the system level differences in evaluating and 
confirming reliability, the implementation of redundancy was still the common 
approach to achieve the reliability goals. 
Many similarities were seen within the topic of the prevention of 
systematic faults. The use of lifecycle processes, the use of hardware and 
software design verification and validation, the use of hazard/failure analysis, and 
attention to preventing common cause failure were all observed to be universal. 
There was variation in the levels of implementation between the different 
industries but the basic elements were there. Those basics are more than 
enough to support the unification of these industries behind IEC 61508 with 
equipment manufacturers. There were acknowledged differences regarding the 
parameters and level of rigor applied to environmental qualification, but this is not 
a fatal flaw for the proposed methodology. Supplemental environmental testing 
and additional mitigating strategies are already implemented by the DOD and 
nuclear industries so that aspect would simply continue to be necessary. 
The practice of suitability evaluations of off-the-shelf equipment is 
implemented to varying degrees by the different industries, but when they occur 
they share common building blocks to prove or disprove suitability. 
The final conclusion in this area is that IEC 61508 has the potential to be a 
very useful vehicle of standardization at the component level (component refers 




solver, or a control element.). It can be a successful link between all of these 
industries and the relevant component manufacturers. There are significant 
differences between complete systems but not among individual components. 
Utilizing the similarities at the component level has the potential to lead to a 
mutually beneficial relationship for the industries and manufacturers. The 
industries will have a wider range of better components available to them, while 
the manufacturers will be able to easily reach a larger customer base. 
Suitability Evaluations of Off-the-Shelf Equipment. 
At this point in time, the standards and guides of the US DOD and nuclear 
industry indicate significant risk in taking on evaluations of off-the-shelf 
equipment [1], [2], [28], but it has been shown that this same level of concern is 
not warranted for equipment that has been certified to be compliant with IEC 
61508 SIL 2 and above requirements. Manufacturers that are able to achieve a 
SIL 2, 3, or 4 certification can be assumed to have a complete and fully 
implemented quality assurance program, and are being intentional about 
defending against random failures and preventing systematic faults. These are 
assumptions that cannot be made about any commercial manufacturer in 
general. It is a win-win situation for high risk managing industries to seek out 
manufacturers that are offering relevant products with these types of 
certifications. This kind of effort is expected to have financial and technical 
benefits for all parties. 
Future Work 
In the future, it could be beneficial to extend the survey to other industries 
such as commercial aerospace, NASA, food and drug production, and medical 
device manufacturing. Due to time limitations, these industries were not able to 
be include in this work. 
It would also be beneficial to take a deeper look at the IEC 61508 SIL 1-4 
requirements and specifically link them to the various classification schemes 
such as IEC 61226 Category A, B, and C, IEEE RISC 1-4, and IEEE Class 1E. 
This will be a critical task for empowering the different industries to embed the 
IEC 61508 SILs into their standard practices and for the regulators of those 
industries to be able to understand and fully embrace this methodology of 
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